

UNIVERSITY FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

**EXAMINING THE IMPEDING FACTORS AND EFFECTS OF
CHIEFTAINCY CONFLICTS IN FUNSI TRADITIONAL AREA
IN THE UPPER WEST REGION OF GHANA**

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UPPER WEST REGION OF GHANA**

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**THIS THESIS IS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF AFRICA AND
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OCTOBER, 2020

DECLARATION

Student

I, Baaberihin Suler declares that this thesis is my original work and it had been duly acknowledged as such and no part presented for another Degree in any University elsewhere except for references which has been duly acknowledged.

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Date.....

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Signature.....

Date:



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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to my parents through them my life has been protected to date. To my late Dad, Baaberihin Bali Baadua and Mrs. Baaberihin Zanabu, the work is dedicated to you.



ABSTRACT

The struggle to rule gave room to chieftaincy dispute for which the study examined the impeding factors and the effects of the Chieftaincy Conflict in Funsì Traditional Area in the Upper West Region of Ghana. Dahrendorf's Conflict and Relative Deprivation theories anchored the study. Case study design was used. A sample of 45 was chosen using purposive and convenience sampling. Semi-structured interview schedules were used to collect the data. The data was analyzed using content and thematic analyses. Inadequate documentation on succession route, not complying with tradition, mistrust, poverty, politicization, and monarchical nature of the chieftaincy institution were the impeding causes to the installation of the paramount chief of the Funsì Traditional Area. Also, injuries and deaths, trauma, homelessness, damage to infrastructure, collapsed of social ties, and difficulty to access social services were the socio-cultural effects of the Conflict. Moreover, dwindling food production, price hike, low sales, difficulty in accessing transport to travel, soaring unemployment, loss of labour force, and upsurge in middlemen in business were the economic and political effects of the conflict. Furthermore, supernatural arbitration, sensitization and public campaign, use of legal system, dialogue and capacity building, and use of eminent personalities were the non-violent mechanisms whiles the use of security forces was a violent approach for resolving the conflict. To conclude, using the non-violent mechanisms, the feuding gates should be prevailed upon to cease fire to atone the social- cultural, economic and political effects of the conflict on the lives of inhabitants in the Funsì Traditional Area. The study recommended that the Wa East District Assembly, Upper West Regional House of Chiefs and the Ministry of Chieftaincy should synchronize and codify the customary laws with the constitutional and legal instruments on the succession route to the Funsì Chieftaincy Title.



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LIST OF ACRONYMS

BNI	Bureau of National Investigation
CID	Criminal Investigation Department
DFID	Department for International Development
DCE	District Chief Executive
DPCU	District Planning Coordinating Unit
DISEC	District security committee
FUTA	Funsi Traditional Area
IEA	Institute of Economic Affairs
JHS	Junior High School
JC	Judicial Committee
KG	Kindergarten
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NADMO	National Disaster Management Organization



NPP	New Patriotic Party
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
PM	Presiding Member
REGSEC	Regional security committee
RDT	Relative Deprivation Theory
SHS	Senior High School
SOSTYA	South Sissala Tertiary Youth Association
UK	United Kingdom
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
URHCs	Upper West Regional House of Chiefs
WEDA	Wa East District Assembly



CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

According to Nukunya (2003) chieftaincy is the oldest political systems in the traditional Ghanaian society before the emergence of colonialism and it is classified into centralized and the acephalous (non-centralized) systems. The centralized system exists in the societies that have a chief or king whose authority and control is respected within his jurisdiction. This system has a well distinct boundary and administrative machinery, legislative and judicial institutions for governance over his subjects. Notable among the ethnic group that practices this system now is the Sissala in the Funi Traditional Area where the study is being undertaken. On the other hand, the acephalous (non-centralized) system is a stateless society with no chief or king and lack clear boundaries, judicial, legislative and administrative procedures in exercise of their authority. The lineage, sectional or clan heads exercise the political control but this is not beyond the respective lineage, section or clan and as a result they are otherwise called egalitarian or non-stratified societies like the Talensi (Nukunya, 2003)

Prah and Yeboah (2011) noted that as a centralized form of administration, the importance of the chieftaincy institution cannot be overemphasized as it is an embodiment of political power in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial times. A Chief is the epitome of our rich culture, initiates change, change initiator as well as introduces innovations and strategies for the development of their communities. Chiefs attend important meetings and ceremonies on behalf of their subjects. He



performs a liaison role by relating to others outside his jurisdiction, he acts as an information disseminator by transmitting information to his subject.

The chief also serves as a spokesperson for his community and the outside world. As a disturbance handler, he settles disputes between various parties in his communities (Asamoah, 2012).

According to Institute of Economic Affairs (2010) the chieftaincy institution is of tremendous importance in Ghana and must be maintained for its embodiment of the cultural and customary essence of the life of the people. It is a fact that from community to community, the authority of chiefs continues to be more revered, feared, and their views and directives more likely to be implemented than that of government as the chiefs are reflection of their peculiar localities (United Nations Environment Programme, 2009).

Acheampong (2010:16) concluded that “the main functions of the institution include control of land, finance, trade both internal and external, defense, law and order, maintenance of peace among the people and their allies, and issues relating to social and cultural matters”. This has characterized the true existence of a chief in human society which has to be harnessed.

Tonah (2012) asserted that chiefs do not only command considerable respect amongst their subjects, they also have access to considerable resources including the labour of their subjects, land, livestock, minerals, water and trees of economic value. Due to this, becoming a chief is not merely a contest between individual members of the royal group but involves the contestants’ families, lineages and clans as well as their friends and supporters. As a result, successive governments of Ghana have relied on



the chiefs' support and worked hand in hand with them in mobilizing their respective community members for the needed taxes, finances, human resource and natural resources for developmental projects.

Unfortunately, as population across the world is rising so has conflict abounds and become inevitable in human society. One of the significant drivers of conflict creating violence is the contestation for chieftaincy. This stress and exacerbates tension and perpetuate violence undermining peace which threatens the health, livelihoods and security of people (United Nations Environment Programme, 2009).

According to DFID (2001) Sub-Saharan Africa within the last two decades has witnessed the highest affected continent in conflicts where 24 of the most war-affected countries between 1980 and 1994 across the world, Africa recorded 10 with 4 of these conflicts on the continent (Liberia, Angola, Mozambique and Somalia) ranked within the five most severely affected countries in the world. This signifies that the continent has not only witnessed numerous conflicts but experienced conflicts that are among the most disastrous thereby destroying lives, properties and the environment.

According to Tonah (2012) most of the chieftaincy conflicts in Ghana are typically succession disputes, involving two or more gates laying claim to a chieftaincy position or title about who is the best qualified person to occupy the title. These rampant chieftaincy disputes hamper progress and for that reason most people hold the view that the institution is of no relevance (Asamoah, 2012).

There is a perception that northern Ghana is conflict prone probably because of the violent, protracted and wide nature of these conflicts involving several ethnic groups





across large geographical area. These conflicts emanate from succession disputes that two or more gates contending for a chieftaincy position or title. The qualified person to occupy a particular position; which traditional rituals constitute the “enskinment” process and whether the individual selected has gone through the appropriate rituals administered by the traditionally designated persons and gazette. These conflicts sometimes become protracted and involve members of the entire lineage, clan or ethnic group (Tonah, 2012). The rampant nature of these chieftaincy disputes from the ‘enstoolment’ and ‘destoolment’ of chiefs hamper progress and derailing relevance of the institution and this militates against the chief presiding over his subjects. As a result, winning the maximum goodwill and cooperation of the communities in these chieftaincy conflict areas become a serious impediment (Asamoah, 2012).

More so, according to United Nations Environment Programme (2009) chieftaincy conflict disrupts institutions, initiatives and mechanisms of policy coordination which in turn creates space for poor management, lack of investment and illegality. It creates weak governance institutions and expressions of authority, accountability and transparency are frequently eroded by such conflicts. When tensions intensify and the rule of law breaks down, the resulting institutional vacuum can lead to a culture of impunity and corruption as public officials begin to ignore governance norms and structures, focusing instead on their personal interests. Financial resources are diverted away from investments in public infrastructure and essential services towards military interventions (United Nations Environment Programme, 2009). This limits domestic savings and internal or external investment since this could bring about capital flight and inability of states to invest in their own populations or through high military spending which has squeezed investment in the economy (DFID, 2001).



Prah and Yeboah (2011) noted that chieftaincy conflicts are not restricted to only one Traditional Area but include the Dagbon crisis between the Abudu and the Andani gates which peaked in 2002, the Ga Mantse in 2007, that of Anlo in 2007, the Adoagyiri in 2007 and Princess and Aketeki towns' in 2007. The Funsu Chieftaincy Conflict or Dispute is not a recent development but existed since 1920. However, the current dispute started in 2005. It was only Gbeelonosi and Kunkongbuni gates that used to occupy the Funsu Skin on rotational bases until after 2001 when the Muliabee gate began advocating for inclusion. Whereas the Funsu chieftaincy conflict had seen renewed clashes since 2005, it has still not witnessed any research, attracted central government attention to be resolved irrespective of its heightened tension.

1.2 Problem Statement

Globally, development in contemporary times stresses on community participation and the chieftaincy institution is one of the political structures in Ghana with much recognition especially in the rural society for promoting unity and mobilizing people and the needed resources for development.

According to Acheampong (2010) the lack of alternate succession to the title with the winner takes all affair may have contributed to the observed fierce nature of ascending to the throne. As a result, every royal wants to become a chief and would undertake both legitimate and illegitimate means to eventually rise to the kingship position and thereby causing the conflict.

According to Awedoba (2009), there were about 232 reported chieftaincy disputes filed at the Ministry for chieftaincy and culture where the then 3 northern regions of Ghana witnessed the majority. The author further found that the era of 17 paramountcies in the Upper West Region suffered 17 chieftaincy disputes pending

before the Judicial Committee of the Upper West Regional House of chiefs. This indicated that at the time, the number of chieftaincy disputes in the Region was equal to the number of paramountcies. These and still counting have made the chieftaincy institution to be bedeviled with conflicts.

The chieftaincy title of Finsi in the past used to occur in rotational manner between two gates (Balonosi and Kunkongbuni) but degenerated into conflict when a third gate (Muliabee) began advocating for inclusion as the third gate among which the chieftaincy title should rotate. This gate argued that they were among the royals in the past but for lack of worthy persons; they ceded their turn to the other two gates (Balonosi and Kunkongbuni) and now feel that they have the said personalities hence the comeback. Their push to occupy the skin could not have come at a better time than the passing away of the immediate late chief, 'Kuoru' (Chief) Nwadei Bayong from the Kunkongbuni gate in 2001.

The claim of the Muliabee gate as being part of the royals of Finsi was accepted by the Kunkongbuni gate while the Gbeelonsi gate and Kpanjagabee (Earth Priests) rejected the claim. Even when the skin used to rotate between the initial two gates (Balonosi and Kunkongbuni), it used to be like a tag of war as each gates always tried to hold on to the skin even if it was not their turn.

Since 1920, there has never been a consensus on any of the gates to occupy the Skin and less through litigations and arbitrations. However, the search for a replacement for this time round became more complex and hostile due to the inclusion of the third gate (Muliabee).



As a result, the Wa Municipal Security Council took the matter to the Wa ‘Naa’ (chief) who was superintending over the Finsi skin for determination in 2004. The Wa Naa in his ruling in 2005 upheld the Muliabee people position of the existence of three royal gates with Muliabee as the third gate. Hence, Mr. James Dumah from the Muliabee gate was enskined as the chief of Finsi. This ruling of the Council infuriated the Kpanjagabee (the earth priest) and Gbeelonsi gate which led to clashes on the very day the newly enskined chief was escorted to Finsi. The clashes left one person dead and several others injured. (GNA, 6 Sep. 2005).

Gbeelonsi gate and some aggrieved kingmakers from the town filed a petition at the Wa High Court to overturn the decision of the Wa Naa. In the wisdom of the court, ruled that the court lacks jurisdiction to overturn the ruling. The Court further ruled that the Wa Naa erred in forming an adhoc committee to look into the matter instead of a judicial member committee. The court asked the petitioners to go and appeal against the process either at the Wa Naa’s Palace or at the Judicial Committee of the Upper West Region if they are disgruntled.

The petitioners agreed to arbitrate at the Waala Traditional Council. The Traditional Council then formed the recommended committee and went through the arbitration process. In their conclusion on 1st May 2006, reaffirmed their earlier ruling that, Mr. James Dumah was from a legitimate royal gate and can occupy the Finsi skin (**Source:** Minutes of the Arbitration proceedings on the Wa Naa’s ruling). Another petition was subsequently filed at the JC of the Upper West House of Chiefs summoning Wa Naa and Mr. James Dumah and it was also dismissed for lack of merit (Source: URCHs).





However, Mr. James Dumah who was declared the legitimate occupant of the Funsí skin and has since been gazetted, has not been allowed the opportunity to operate or hold himself as the chief of Funsí. Any attempt by him usually results into renewed clashes with its attendant consequences. The renewed clashes since 2003 continued to cause loss of lives, damage to property, collapse of businesses, insecurity and creating fear and panic in the town which is also the District capital of Wa East district. The creation of the Ministry for chieftaincy and culture, chieftaincy Act, (Act 370) and Regional and National House of Chiefs are efforts made to resolve chieftaincy conflicts in Ghana. Unfortunately, these institutions have not resolved the Funsí Chieftaincy Conflict and the violent clashes continuous to erupt and it attended consequences mentioned earlier on residents. Again, successive National governments have also failed in their bids to constitute the necessary committees in place to help resolved the Conflict as in the case of the Dagbon Chieftaincy Conflict and many other places. Though Chieftaincy Conflicts are largely localized (as the disputes occur within the boundaries of the Traditional state), and the associated violence hardly spill over into neighboring traditional states, the conflict's social, political and economic ripples become felt beyond the conflict zone (Osei-Tutu, J. Kwadwo 2005).

It is therefore necessary to undertake this study to establish the impeding factors and effects of the chieftaincy conflict on the Funsí Traditional Area.

1.3 Main Research Question

What are the implications of the chieftaincy conflict on the people of the Funsí Traditional Area in the Wa East District of the Upper West Region of Ghana?

1.3.1 Specific Research Questions

1. What factors impede the lawful installation of a substantive paramount chief in the Funsì Traditional Area?
2. How is the chieftaincy conflict affecting the socio-cultural life of people in the Funsì Traditional Area?
3. What are the economic and political implications of the chieftaincy conflict in the Funsì Traditional Area?
4. Which mechanisms can be put in place to resolve the chieftaincy conflict in the Funsì Traditional Area?

1.4 Main Research Objective:

To examine the implications of the chieftaincy conflict in Funsì Traditional Area in the Wa East District of the Upper West Region of Ghana.

1.4.1 Specific Objectives:

1. To examine the factors that impedes the lawful installation of a substantive paramount chief in the Funsì Traditional Area.
2. To determine how the chieftaincy conflict is affecting the socio-cultural life of people in the Funsì Traditional Area.
3. To ascertain the economic and political implications of the chieftaincy conflict in the Funsì Traditional Area.
4. To examine mechanisms that can be put in place to resolve the chieftaincy conflict in the Funsì Traditional Area.

1.5 Significance of study

The research mapped out factors that impeded the lawful installation of the paramount chief in the Funsì Traditional Area. As a result, the findings would serve as practical



and relevant working guide and provide basis for policy making towards resolving and managing conflicts.

Also, the study would help in contributing to the knowledge base on effects of Chieftaincy Conflicts. This could help future researchers improved upon their studies.

The study documented the social, cultural, economic and political outcomes of the conflict and how that drained the economy of the district such that the parties fuelling the conflict would come to terms with the consequences of their own acts which would help ease tension and facilitate a possible cease fire in the Funsì Chieftaincy conflict.

1.6 Scope of the Study

Funsì is the Traditional capital of the FUTA and is also the District capital of the Wa East District. Funsì Traditional Area (FUTA) constitutes Funsì and seven other communities (Yaala, Kullung, Buffiama, Jumo, Tinniabee, Sawuobee and Nyinban Duu). The Funsì Skin is a paramount skin and the study area falls under the Funsì skin. The dominant religion in the study area is Islam and the main occupation of the people is farming.

The study examined the socio-cultural effects on the life of people in the Funsì Traditional Area, economic and political implications of the chieftaincy conflict and offered mechanisms to resolve the chieftaincy conflict in the Funsì Traditional Area.

1.7 Organization of the Study

For purposes of analysis and easy comprehension of issues, this study was divided into five chapters. Each chapter deals with a series of relevant themes. Chapter one consisted of the background of the study, problem statement, main and specific



research questions, main and specific research objectives that guided the study. The chapter further outlined the significance of the study, the scope which looks at the working boundary of the study and lastly, the organization of the study.

Chapter Two dealt with definitions for the key concepts in the study and the relationships between these concepts. It also looked at the theoretical themes relevant to the study, dealt with literature review. The review was from books, journals, published theses, reports and websites for which gaps were identified in the literature that this research filled.

Chapter Three was on methodology. This chapter explained the research design, target population, sample size, sampling methods, instruments for data collection, and sources of secondary data, Ethical considerations and how the data was analyzed.



CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter is made up of two parts. The first part provided definitions for key concepts or words in the study and relationships between these concepts. The second part also looked at theoretical underpinnings (Dahrendorf's Conflict Theory and Relative Deprivation Theory) relevant to the study. The researcher also reviewed existing scholarly literature on the subject under study. The chapter was organized in line with the objectives of the study.

2.2 Definition of Key concepts

Asamoah (2010:16) noted that "chieftaincy could be defined as an organized system of rule in the African traditional society with the chief as the symbolic head (or the first among equals). In most parts of Africa, the first person to have occupied a particular geographical area became chief over the people who later inhabited that territory. These chiefs ruled based on the total consent of the people. The chief had a great deal of powers vested in him during the pre-colonial era".

The Supreme Law of Ghana, the 1992 Constitution of the Fourth Republic sees a chief as "a person who hailing from the appropriate family and lineage has been validly nominated, elected or selected and enstooled, en-skinned or installed as a chief or queen mother in accordance with the relevant customary law and usage."

A chief is a 'person elected or selected in accordance with customary usage and recognized by the government to wield authority and perform functions derived from tradition or assigned by central government within specified areas' (Arhin, 1985 cited in Asamoah, 2012: 90). This meant for a chief to have the legitimate power, his



qualification, selection and installation requires the authentication of the government and the people of the community whom the chief exercises the authority over. Thus, a chief is the one who has the traditional legitimate authority and recognized by government to exercise political, economic, cultural, and social and health powers over his subjects. This positions chiefs as development agents who liaise and partners with government and other agencies to attract the desired development for their jurisdictions. This vital collaboration required from chiefs and the government aids co-existence among the citizenry.

Chieftaincy

The term chieftaincy is derived from the word chief and refers to the office and the Institution of which the chief is the principal operator and stakeholder. Chieftaincy may, thus, comprise among other things the personnel holding offices such as chiefs, queen mothers, Counselors and staff, rituals, symbol and other paraphernalia. This research adopts the definition of chieftaincy to mean the customs, laws, practice and process of electing or selecting and installing chiefs in Ghana as well as the legitimacy and powers conferred on them in accordance with the 1992 Constitution of Ghana.

Chieftaincy Conflict or Dispute

There is a thin line between conflicts and disputes. Scholars in security and conflict Studies simply define conflict as a struggle or contest between people with opposing views, needs, ideas, beliefs, values, or goals. Conflict is therefore seen to be the result of the interaction of political, economic and social instability, frequently stemming from bad governance, failed economic policies and inappropriate development programmes that have exacerbated ethnic or religious differences (Bassey, 2007:1).



On the other hand, the term dispute has its origin in disagreements between individuals.

However, a statement by one person that is contradicted by another does not necessarily give rise to a dispute. The disagreement only becomes a dispute when one or other party cannot live with the consequences of the disagreement, and insists on having it resolved. Disputes therefore mostly arise either from a genuine difference of opinion or from disingenuous self-interest. In this research however, both terms, chieftaincy conflicts and disputes, are used interchangeably to describe the open hostility between the feuding groups in the Funsí Chieftaincy conflict.

Conflict resolution

Wallenstein (2002) defines conflict resolution as getting the conflicting parties enter into agreement that solves their incompatibilities and enable them to accept to continue to co-exist and cease all violent actions against each other. Putting the various perspectives together conflict resolution in this study essentially entails a set of mechanisms adopted to manage the chieftaincy conflict situation in Funsí.

2.3 Theoretical Underpinning of the Study

There is considerable literature on chieftaincy in Ghana and Africa as a whole because of the crucial role it plays in politics in times past and present political equations. The vast literature has looked at chieftaincy as an institution that has evolved over the years to remain relevant in post-independence African states. Considerable literature could be found on chieftaincy and the state (Adjaye & Misawa 2006; Boafo-Arthur, 2001; Dankwa, 2004; Ray, 1996), chieftaincy and development (Arhin & Pavanello, 2006; Bob-Milliar, 2009; Kleist, 2011; Ray & Eizlini, 2011), chieftaincy and politics or democracy (Boafo-Arthur, 2006; Dankwa, 2004; Keulder,



2000; Mahama, 2002), chieftaincy and local governance (Ayee, 2007; Nyendu, 2011; Ray, 2003). The central argument of these works is that the chieftaincy institution in Ghana is robust and dynamic; and continues to re-invent itself to become relevant in the changing political environment of the country. Some of these works see the chieftaincy institution as a partner and not a competitor of the post-colonial state (see Russell & Dobson, 2011), while others see chieftaincy as a competitor of the post-colonial state (see Rathbone, 2000; Ray, 1996). For both however, the post-colonial state would benefit greatly if it could harness the chieftaincy institution as a resource and mechanism for growth and development (see Adjaye & Misawa 2006; Dankwa, 2004; Keulder 2000; Ray, 1996). A threat, such as chieftaincy conflicts, to the institution is therefore argued by these scholars to be a threat to the security of the state.

Scholars over the years have therefore investigated what the motivation for groups to engage in violent chieftaincy conflicts such as those in Ghana are. This is because conflicts in whatever form do not just exist or come into being. They are the product of deliberate choices of people to pursue certain goals with violent means. In the light of this, this study deploys Dahrendorf's Conflict Theory and the Relative Deprivation Theory to put this study into perspective and investigate the research questions.

2.3.1 Dahrendorf's Conflict Theory

According to Ritzer (2008) Dahrendorf's Conflict Theory is oriented toward the study of social institutions like that of the chieftaincy Institution which is subject to processes of change where the dissension leading to conflict is contributing to the change.



The theory sees society to have conflict phase and consensus phase which co-exist and are prerequisites for each other and as such, society cannot have conflict unless there is some prior consensus. It is consensus that makes people relate resulting in conflict and the vice versa. So, when there is no contact between people, there will be no prior integration to serve as a basis for the occurrence of chieftaincy conflict and invariably conflict can be constructive when it leads to consensus and integration of an area (Ritzer, 2008).

The theory emphasized that the search for power to exercise authority over others in maintaining order in society is what foisted chieftaincy conflict since authority does not reside in individuals but in positions. Those who occupy the positions of authority dominate as they exercise control over their subordinates because of the expectations of the subjects attached to the position but not the personality occupying the position which makes the various gates struggle for the chieftaincy title. This is because occupying the title accords one the legitimate authority to control the subject and bring sanctions against those who do not comply (Ritzer, 2008). The ability to secure the legitimate power to hold the chieftaincy title by a gate does not always require any use of force to rule because the domination is accepted by the subjects as right and in order. The chieftaincy institution wields traditional authority whose legitimacy is established from beliefs and sanctity or sacredness of immemorial culture (Dzorgbo, 2013).

Robbins and Judge (2012) asserted that once a particular gate gets the nod to occupy a chieftaincy title, the gate has the legitimate power and the formal authority to control and use resources on behalf of the subordinates because the subjects have had the acceptance of the authority of the position.





Ritzer (2008) noted that the Dahrendorf's Conflict Theory sees conflict as inevitable because the gate occupying or whichever gate occupied the chieftaincy position seeks to maintain the status quo while the other feuding parties in subordinate positions seek change and therefore, makes the legitimacy of authority of any occupant to the skin always precarious due to the threat of contending gates. There is no winner in the conflict as the entire people are the losers especially, relatives or family members of the dead, the tortured and those victims whose properties were destroyed in the conflict. Interestingly, the conflict has remained protracted and this has a bearing with Dahrendorf's Conflict Theory (Ritzer, 2008)

Issifu and Asante (2015) noted that chieftaincy conflicts bothers on claims to values and power contestation or chieftaincy succession struggle which fits into the Dahrendorf's Conflict Theory. The theory admonished that the power at stake makes the conflict unpredictable, sudden, shocking, persistent and vicious with deteriorating economic and social life and livelihood of the people (Issifu and Asante, 2015). This therefore situates well with regards to the conflict in the Funsì Traditional Area.

The theory has been criticized for ignoring conflict and change, for being ideologically radical, and is almost wholly macroscopic and as a result has little to offer to our understanding of individual thought and action (Ritzer, 2008) and as a result, the Relative Deprivation Theory is used as a second theory to anchor the study.

2.3.2 Relative Deprivation Theory

Relative deprivation theory is of the view that the experience of being denied of chieftaincy title to which a person believes he is entitled to creates conflict. Relative Deprivation Theory is credited to sociologist Samuel Stouffer who developed the approach while studying social psychology during World War II. The discontent

people have for not being in the chieftaincy position belittles them when they are compared to others holding the title creating negative discrepancy between legitimate expectations of wanting to be a chief and present occupant of the title Bayertz, (1999) cited in Ahiave (2013). Therefore, when expectations to become a chief do not meet attainment, there is a high tendency for people to engage in conflict with those who they hold responsible for depriving them of the chieftaincy title.

According to Runciman (1966) cited in Ahiave (2013) there are four preconditions of relative deprivation theory:

1. Person “A” does not occupy the chieftaincy title of Funsì
2. Person “A” knows the occupant of the chieftaincy title of Funsì
3. Person “A” wants to be the occupant of the chieftaincy title of Funsì
4. Person “A” believes obtaining the chieftaincy title is realistic.

The consequences of both behavior and attitudes brings the feeling of stress and the grievance of feeling deprived of the chieftaincy entitlement makes the individuals engage in behaviors that cause conflict when their means do not match their goals. A contending gate in the Funsì chieftaincy conflict that had ever held the chieftaincy title or is holding the title is more likely to feel as a derivatives than a gate that never had the opportunity to occupy the position. The conflict erupts as one faction feels deprived of the skin (Ahiave, 2013).

Issifu and Asante (2015) said the theory sees the deprivation of the chieftaincy title as the unmet need which each of the contending gates is bent on achieving, making the conflict intractable in nature. It might be so or not in the Funsì Traditional Area and that the protracted nature of the conflict tends to affect society’s development.



2.4 Factors that impedes the lawful installation of Chiefs

The ascribed nature of chieftaincy institution brings about conflict. Acheampong (2010:16) explained that “chieftaincy in Africa is normally hereditary from a particular family or ethnic group and comparable to monarchical type of rule in Europe and some parts of Asia”. It “has emerged from the social fabric of the land..., it is nobody’s creation and therefore cannot be easily destroyed” Dankwa, (2004 cited in Acheampong (2010:15).

Chieftaincy rule in Africa in general and Ghana in particular is the preserve of a small group of privileged people of a patrilineal (Northern Ghana) or matrilineal (Southern Ghana) descendants of the founding family of the community where most rule for life. These traditional communities are categorized into a small group of royals constituting the ruling class and on the other hand are the majority referred to as commoner (Tonah, 2012 cited in Mohammed, 2015). Corporate groups of kin or relatives exist whose members trace putative ties to common ancestors and share the rights and succession to the chieftaincy positions based largely on paternal ties where sons succeed fathers, brothers succeed brothers and so on and so forth (Awedoba, 2015). The commoners have now joined the competition as they have considered themselves suitable candidates due to their high educational qualification and wealth. According to Acheampong (2010) the lack of alternate succession to the title with the winner takes all affair may have contributed to the observed fierce nature of ascending to the throne. As a result, every royal wants to become a chief and would undertake both legitimate and illegitimate means to eventually rise to the kingship position and thereby causing the conflict.



According to Dzorgbo (2013) the procedure for succession to the skin is orally institutionalize and clearly established by customary practices and conventions and not everyone is permitted to ascend to be chief let alone the paramount chief of a Traditional area. Despite the pre-requisite requirement to be chosen as a chief is to come from the royal gate, in contemporary times the criterion in addition encompass some level of achievement (Dzorgbo, 2013) including wealth, educational status and political power.

According to Awedoba (2015) not complying with oral tradition on chieftaincy succession causes chieftaincy conflict. Breach of customs where dubious and distant personalities have ignored the laid down traditional rules and regulations in Funsu but rather condone and connive with greed kingmakers to be enskined or enstooled as chiefs cannot escape blame in chieftaincy conflicts. The author further opined that chiefs in some communities interfere in the work of the ‘tendanas’ (earth priests) and kingmakers which creates friction between them and the respective chiefs. As a result, wealthy people usually influence the kingmakers to make them chiefs even when they do not qualify. This is because the kingmakers predated the chieftaincy institution in many communities in the northern Ghana. Therefore, they determine the best qualified person to ascend to the chieftaincy title by performing the legitimate ritual activities during the enstoolment or destoolment of a chief (Awedoba, 2015; Mohammed, 2015). So, when the kingmakers are compromised in their duties, it gives an undue advantage to a particular gate to outwit the rest of the gates, to ascend to the throne or stay in power forever and this results in chieftaincy conflicts due to resistance from other legitimate claimants.



Tonah, (2012) have all descended on the search for the chieftaincy title of a traditional area. This is contentious aspiration creating inter-gate and even intra-gate suspicion causing conflict.

Prah and Yeboah (2011) asserted that inordinate ambition for power makes the political and economic elite even when sometimes not from the royal gate contend for the chieftaincy title. The suspicion between the factions breeds tension among the contending gates which creates latent conflict and subsequently blown into conflict in a traditional area. Similarly, the more recent push to institute democratic reforms has often induced political leaders to court political support from loyal kin groups and broader ethnic support bases to help secure electoral victories, limit support for political rivals, and restrict the mobilization of potential challengers. This insistence on democratization of independent countries created factionalism and chieftaincy conflict in Ghana as a whole by the colonial government whom should be held responsible for the conflicts (Tonah, 2012; Acheampong, 2010). So as a result, not even the 1992 Constitution that insulates the chieftaincy institution from the state's control to ensure the political neutrality, independence, prestige and survival of the chieftaincy institution has succeeded.

2.5 Socio-cultural Effects of the chieftaincy conflicts

According to Bukari et al (2017) conflict traumatized people as they get emotional creating bitterness, hostility and divisiveness among the feuding parties to the extent that they do not want to set eyes on, or associate with each other due to the division within their ranks. As a result, projects initiated in the conflicting community suffer because the disputants cannot present a united front to pursue common objectives for collective gain. This paralyses the community as they are unable to take collective



action. Things that could be done within a shorter time get lengthy or may not be done at all (Bukari et al, 2017). This is because of the indelible scars whether physical or psychological in the psyche of disputants, victims and their caregivers (UNICEF, 2015).

Prah and Yeboah (2011) noted chieftaincy conflict creates an atmosphere of anxiety, insecurity and distrust posing a threat to the peace and stability of the entire nation.

UNICEF (2015) indicated that conflict renders people homeless. According to DFID (2001) conflict made eleven million people in Africa internally displaced and these persons now outwit refugees by a ratio of three to one and unfortunately both refugees and internally displaced people together amounts to 14 million people in Africa. Another millions of people lost their homes and livelihood, increasing numbers of civilian casualties and levels of violence, abuse and mutilation (DFID, 2001) as in Libya, the escalation of violence in May 2014 left more than 434,000 people internally displaced (UNICEF, 2015).

Furthermore, Prah and Yeboah (2011) found 500 residents in the Tuobodom chieftaincy conflict internally displaced while most able-bodied men, women and children had fled the town for fear of further reprisals. The conflict saw 92 security officials deployed to the area to maintain law and order and the displaced people were managed by the National Disaster Management Organization, NADMO. As the control of such a conflict is done by security personnel deployed to the affected areas at huge cost to the neglect of important developmental issues, becomes a drain on the national purse. Also, the Tuobodom conflict hinders the progress of academic activities where the only Senior High School in the town including all basic schools was deserted by both students and teachers (Prah and Yeboah, (2011). This has the



potential of affecting the learning outcomes of the students and the training of human resource.

UNICEF (2015) affirmed that conflict forced people to flee their homes for fear of their lives as they get scared of being the next target to be attacked, maimed or killed. This may result in forced migration or refugees where the displaced families may even perish in the attempt to migrate to escape attack. The migration may either be internally or externally and at worst the displaced people are forced to be in refugee camps. These camps may be tents, public buildings like classrooms, churches, market stalls and empty workshops or warehouses that the families share as hanging laundry in the hallways, preparing meals in the courtyard, and sleeping in classrooms where students once studied. Even where refugee camps are established, these camps may suffer from disruption and inadequacies in basic services such as food, electricity, water, sanitation and security (United Nations Environment Programme, 2009). These have dire consequences on the dignity of the victims.

2.6 Economic and political implications of chieftaincy conflicts

Price hike is one of the economic effects of the chieftaincy conflicts. According to Mohammed (2015) women bemoaned that because of gate difference from their business partners in the Dagbon chieftaincy conflict; sometimes they deliberately hike goods' prices to frustrate people at the opposing gate. They increase the price or hoard goods to ward off opponents from the other gate so that they could give to their allies (partners within their gate). Conflict creates suspicion and mistrust which will emerge during interactions or bargaining time in markets making it difficult for the seller and the buyer from the opposing gates to get-together in the markets or to agree on price favorable to both parties. As they belong to different gates some will refuse to do



business with one another because of much suspicion and mistrust (Mohammed, 2015).

Poverty is one of the compounding causes of chieftaincy conflicts. Awedoba (2015) noted regrettably poverty due to the exploitation and neglect of the north by the colonial and postcolonial politicians or leaders has impoverished the north and exacerbated by conflict which contributed to cause and fuel many conflicts. This colonial and post-colonial neglect of Northern Ghana is further manifested in the very minimal presence of state institutions, public personnel including the security forces, police stations, and courts, low levels of education and the dearth of socio-economic infrastructure causing the widespread poverty in the area (Tonah, 2012; Mohammed, 2015).

According to Ahiave (2015) mistrust is one of the factors affecting the lawful installation of chiefs. The gates usually oppose vehemently the plans of their contenders and perceive the ideas and opinions of the other as an attempt to hijack or by-pass peace processes. These entrenched positions become a big threat to installation of the chief for the restoration of peace and tranquility (Issifu and Asante, 2015).

Low Sales is one of the effects of the chieftaincy conflict. Prah and Yeboah (2011) concurred that during conflicts economic activities come to a standstill as shops may close down because of possible looting and burning of the shops or attack on the shop attendants by the opponents in the conflict. Retailers who even want to sell at the expense of their lives or from their bedrooms struggle for supplies from whole sale shops because the delivery of the goods is at risk of vengeance Mohammed, (2015).



Moreover, dwindling food production is one of the effects of chieftaincy conflict. DFID (2001) found that conflict denies people access to their land at critical growing or planting periods, disrupts markets and restricts sales of farm inputs and produce thereby increasing the prices.

Difficulty in accessing public means to travel is another effect of the chieftaincy conflict.

According to Mohammed (2015) means of transport becomes difficult to access in times of escalated conflict.

Destruction of wildlife is one effect that cannot be skipped. United Nations Environment Programme (2009) indicated that violent conflicts can result in the physical destruction of ecosystems and wildlife. Livelihoods and ecosystem services are damaged, degraded or destroyed either due to the total collapse of traditional management practices and or the release of polluting and hazardous substances into the natural environment during conflict. This collapse of governance structures contributes directly to widespread institutional failures in all sectors, allowing opportunistic entrepreneurs to establish uncontrolled systems of resource exploitation.

Conflict also tends to confuse property rights, undercut positive environmental practices, and compromise dispute resolution mechanisms. Therefore, violent conflicts at the local level hinder the resolution of conflict and complicate peace efforts twice as likely to relapse into conflict within the first five years (United Nations Environment Programme 2009). Increasing demographic pressure and urbanization, inequitable access to and shortage of land, and resource depletion are



widely predicted to worsen, with profound effects on the stability of both rural and urban settings (DFID, 2001).

Furthermore, soaring unemployment is one of the effects of chieftaincy conflicts.

Mohammed (2015) confirmed that chieftaincy conflict left millions of youth unemployed in Africa who are found more in the fringes of social systems and rural areas than urban centres. This left the youth disgruntled and is uncontrollable, aggressive and violent in most cases drawing them to join rebel groups or factions in conflict situations in order to be offered a token for survival.

Second but last loss of labour force is one of the effects. Marshall (2005) noted the killing, migration, displacement, arresting and detention or even imprisonment of people that may occur in conflict areas reduce the number of the energetic people or working class from the conflict environment who would have helped work to increase productivity.

Lastly, upsurge of middlemen which is a discriminatory trade is another ill of the chieftaincy conflict. The middlemen create unhealthy competition in the market as they mess up businesses by hijacking the supply and distribution chain making it very difficult for one to get the required quantity of goods one requires. These agents deliberately or has the potential of increasing hoarding and smuggling of goods and services which is a bureaucracy in the business transaction process (Mohammed, 2015).

2.7 Mechanisms that can be put in place to resolve chieftaincy conflicts

Ahiave (2013) asserted that contesting parties have to agree to submit themselves to supernatural arbitration through oracles, sworn statement and an oath in the



traditional area as a way of settling chieftaincy conflicts. The fear for the quick sanction from the oracles and the oaths deters disputants who know their claim is unjust and thus abandon the fight for the chieftaincy title (Ahiave, 2013) in a traditional area.

Lanek (1999) cited in Ahiave (2013) further found the drinking of the bitter herb offered by kingmakers ruled by consent as an indigenous approach to chieftaincy conflict resolution. When this happens claimants who have no legitimacy to the throne acknowledge their guilty, the guilty repenting, the guilty asking for forgiveness, the guilty paying compensation and the guilty being reconciled with the victim's family through sharing of the bitter drink (Lanek, 1999 cited in Ahiave, 2013). It is important to allow and incorporate customary and traditional ways of settling disputes in traditional areas as the successor to the throne will be a mirror and protector of the culture and tradition of his followers. However, claimants who have no legitimate rights to the throne may hide behind their Islamic or Christian faith and resist such a traditional mechanism of resolving the conflict as they may see that as satanic or evil.

Ahiave (2013) said reliance on the intervention of security personnel will help quell skirmishes which destroy lives and properties and any threat to the peace and security of such areas.

Mbowura (2014) affirmed that the presence of the security at a conflict area like Funsu strongly caution both factions and put fear in them to exercise restraint and avoid any explosive situation. Also, the deployed security officers should be sophisticated



enough in identifying early warning for easy prevention of the conflict (Mbowura, 2014).

Resort to legal system is an important mechanism for conflict resolution; Mbowura (2014). The constitution defines the laws of Ghana to include customary law which by custom are applicable to particular communities, written or unwritten. These laws also include rules determined by the Superior Courts (Article 2, 1992 Constitution cited in Kunbuor (2002), High court and the lower courts.

Owusu-Mensah (2013:42) further noted that the legal system that can be used to resolve chieftaincy dispute is grounded in “the constitution; enactments made by or under the authority of the Parliament established by the constitution; existing laws; orders, rules and regulations made by any other authority under a power conferred by the constitution and the common law of Ghana”. These form the formal court or legal system used in adjudication of chieftaincy disputes such as that of the Funsì Traditional area. Therefore, the prosecutorial body will rely on evidences adduced by the contending parties where all the relevant laws will be cited and the arbitrator or Judge provides the verdict based on the evidence and according to the law which is binding on the parties. The judgment is enforced by the security particularly if one of the parties intends to disrespect the judgment.

Acheampong (2010) indicated that the legal system upholds democratic principles in chieftaincy conflict resolution.

Ahiave (2013) said third party mediation through eminent personalities can help resolve disputes. These are usually well-respected Chiefs, religious leaders and other well respected and neutral persons gotten within or outside the region and used as



power brokers to resolve the chieftaincy conflict. They are selected to act as arbitrators and reconcilers in order to restore peace and maintain harmonious relations between families and clans fighting for the chieftaincy title.

Acheampong (2010) said conflict resolution becomes fruitful through dialogue. This requires networking, lobbying and tactical dissemination of information among the parties. This helps resolves conflict by building trust and confidence through interactions with husbands, brothers, and sons and between and among the feuding gates. Dialogue is done through “talk-to-talk not gun-to-gun as a win-win situation in resolving chieftaincy conflict. Women should be included in this because the voices of women are the voice of God. The women stay home with the children, so they are the best people to talk to the youth to stop fighting and to restore peace. So, the women will better advise their male counterparts to be mindful of speculations about the other factions that are meant to foment tension and social unrest (Acheampong, 2010).

Acheampong (2010) said organized public campaigns in the form of demonstrations to protest against the incremental violation of their human rights can sensitize the people in resolving the conflict. These demonstrations are meant to express the dissatisfaction about the present conflict. This stresses on non-violence means of resolving conflict to armed confrontations which calms the conflict, evidenced by media reports on these petitions and demonstrations. The media can be used as the mouthpiece to raise awareness on the conflicting factions (Acheampong, 2010) and such programmes should aimed at educating the people by highlighting on the effects of the conflict (Ahiave, 2013).





From the literature reviewed above on the causes of chieftaincy conflicts in Ghana, it has been established there exist large body knowledge on chieftaincy conflicts and the causes. However, there were little or no such studies on the Funsí Chieftaincy Conflict. The literature available on the Funsí skin has even deepened the cracks and accentuated the already existing problem. The literature is also divided on the actual number of royal gates within Funsí and its adjoining villages. Tonah (2012) and Acheampong (2010) also argues that the insistence on democratization of independent countries created factionalism and chieftaincy conflict in Ghana as a whole by the colonial government whom should be held responsible for the conflicts. As a result, not even the 1992 Constitution that insulates the chieftaincy institution from the state's control to ensure the political neutrality, independence, prestige and survival of the chieftaincy institution has succeeded.

With regards to effects of chieftaincy conflicts, there are quite a few published works on the effects of conflicts on development in Ghana in general, but none on the effects of the Funsí chieftaincy conflict on the development of the Traditional Area. Recent literature on conflicts in Ghana has concentrated on the inter-ethnic and intra ethnic conflicts, since these are the dominant causes of violence in the country. A "governance deficiency" has been cited by some of these works as the cause of the recurring ethnic and communal violence in many parts of Ghana. (Akwetey, 1996: Lund, 2003: Jonsoon, 2007). Akwetey for instance argues that the absence of adequate democratic institutions is to blame for the recurring violence. Avenues for expressing interest and demands are non-existent.

The literature also reveals compelling evidence of strong nexus on chieftaincy conflicts, security and their impact on people. The relationship is like vicious cycle, either of them triggers the other.

It is therefore to fill these gaps in the various works that this research works has become extremely necessary.



CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter dealt with brief profile of the study area, chieftaincy installation in the Funsu Traditional Area, and history of the Funsu chieftaincy conflict, research design, target population, sample size and sampling procedure, methods and instruments for data collection, techniques and process of data collection, Ethical considerations and Data analysis and presentation.

3.2 Profile of The Study Area

Wa East District was carved out of the former Wa District and made a district by L.I 1746 in July 2004. The district is located in the south eastern part of the Upper West region. Funsu, the district capital is about 115 km away from Wa, the regional capital. The district shares boundaries with West Mamprusi to the northwest, West Gonja to southeast and the Sissala East district to the north. It has a landmass of about 4297.1sq/ km², which is located between latitudes 9° 55" N and 10° 25" N and longitude 1° 10" W and 2° 5" W. The district occupies (17.3%) of the total landmass of the region (18,478.4sq/ km²). The remoteness of the district relative to other districts of the region has deprived it of basic social and economic infrastructure and services.

3.2.1 Climate

The climate is tropical equatorial, which prevails throughout the northern part of Ghana. Temperatures are high all-year, reaching its peak in March and April. During this period temperatures could reach as high as 42°C. The temperatures are as low as 22°C in December/January. The Harmattan, characterized by cold, dry dust wind with





occasional haze occurs from November to April. The District has a single rainfall regime, May to October. The average annual rainfall is about 1,200 mm per year and they are torrential, erratic and stormy. The torrential and stormy nature of the rain at the beginning and ending of the raining season normally destroy buildings and farmlands. The single rainfall regime does not also make farming all-year round possible. Most farmers therefore become redundant during the long dry season, from November to May. There is thus the need for irrigation facilities in the district to provide employment opportunities during this period. The vegetation is made up of scattered trees, shrubs and grasses of varying heights. The common trees in the district include Shea trees, baobab, kapok, dawadawa, acacia, neemtrees, ebony, mangoes, and cashew. Annual bush burning, inappropriate farming practices, indiscriminate cutting of trees for wood, charcoal production and poor animal husbandry practices have destroyed 30 percent of the natural vegetation.

The district is also blessed with the “Ambalaara’ Forest Reserve, which has various species of animals, namely, antelopes, baboons, monkeys and lions. The grassy nature of the vegetation, which is excellent for grazing, annually attracts large numbers of alien Fulani herdsmen into the district.

3.2.2 Soils

The soils are mainly sandy loamy which is very fertile and suitable for the cultivation of tubers, cereals and legumes.

3.2.3 Relief and drainage

The land is generally undulating with height between 180-1300 m above sea level. Drainage in the district is the dendrite type, dominated by the Kulpawn River and its tributaries. Most of the rivers overflow their banks during the rainy season and render most parts of the district inaccessible during this period. However, they dry up during

the dry season. The rivers provide vast potentials for the construction of irrigation dams for dry season farming.

3.2.4 Geology

The District consists mainly of igneous and metamorphic rocks and they are noted for deposits of gold, iron and bauxite. Illegal mining activities are therefore taking place in communities such as Bullenga, Duu, Joanfian and Danyokura. The rocks also offer opportunities for a vibrant quarrying industry and their artistic nature presents attraction for tourists.

3.2.5 Political and Administrative structure

The District Assembly is the highest decision-making body in the district. It has two area councils, i.e. Finsi and Bulenga Area Councils, and 25 units/electoral areas. There are, as a result, 25 elected Assembly Members and 11 appointed members. The District Assembly has two committees, namely, the Executive Committee and Complaints and Public Relations Committee. The executive committee is chaired by the DCE while the Presiding Member (PM) chairs the complaints and public relations committee. The executive committee has five statutory subcommittees; Development Planning, Social Services, Works, Finance and Administration, as well as Security and Justice sub committees. These subcommittees assist the executive committee to perform its functions. The District Assembly implements its policies and decisions through the District Assembly Secretariat which is made up of the permanent bureaucrats. This it does through the DPCU which is the technical wing of the Assembly in charge of implementing, monitoring and evaluation of programmes and projects initiated by the General Assembly (Political Bureaucrats). The DPCU is made up of all the decentralized departments which meet quarterly to review activities and plans of the district.




A number of Civil Society Organizations operate in the district. These organizations support the District Assembly in the provision of social infrastructure, capacity building, food security interventions, monitoring and evaluation among others.

3.2.6 Social Structure

There are four major ethnic groups in the district; Wala (45%), Sissala (21%), Chakali (19%) and Dagaaba/Lobi (15%) which is categorized under the Mole Dagbani group in the 2010 Population and Housing Census. Other ethnic groups that reside in the district include Gonjas, Builsas and Fulanis. These ethnic groups co-exist peacefully in the district which is a prerequisite for development. However, the nefarious activities of some Fulani herdsmen such as the burning of the vegetation and destruction of farms in the district are a major potential source of conflicts. Major languages spoken in the district are Waali, Chakali and Sissaali.

Figure 3.1: Map of Wa East District



(Source: 2010 Population and Housing Census report).



3.2.7 Religion

Islam is the dominant religion (70%), followed by Traditional religion (about 20%) and Christianity (10%) in that order. The way of life of the people in the district in terms of marriage rites, the performance of funerals, dressing and naming ceremonies is greatly influenced by Islam.

3.2.8 Economy

The district's economy has three major sectors comprising agriculture, industry and services. Agriculture engages (85%) of the work force, industry (10%) and the services sector (5%).

3.2.9 Agriculture

The district has an agrarian economy. Agriculture and small-scale agro-processing accounts for over 90 percent of the district's income. This sector is the largest, employing over (85%) of the labour force. The agriculture sector has two main subsectors, crop and livestock Population and Housing Census Report, (2010).

3.2.10 Traditional Political System

The traditional political system of the people of Funsì consist of the "Beetina" (earth priest), Funsì "KUORU" (Chief of Funsì), Sectional heads and family heads. The Funsì chief also has some sub-chiefs under him. The sub-chiefs under him are chief of Yaala, Kullung, Buffiama, Jumo, Saawuobee, Duu and Halinboijikpie. However, assertion to the Funsì chieftaincy throne is not promotional as it is happening in other jurisdictions but rather restricted to only the royal gates in Funsì town. Thus, succession to the Funsì skin is by rotational system of election among the royal gates. However, the particular sequence for the rotation between the gates has since been lost due to misunderstandings.



3.3 Research Design

A case study design was used and Creswell (2009) asserted that, case study “is used in a limited way in qualitative research since the inquiry is not to generalize findings to individuals and sites under study. The focus is to develop and describe findings in specific context and sites of the study in the Funsì Traditional Area. Research studies on chieftaincy conflict had often adopted quantitative or mixed methods and were unable to explain the perceptions, emotions, feelings, root causes, implications and context of the conflict from respondents’ in-depth experiences and motives as this qualitative study would do using the case study design. The choice of case study as a qualitative design in the study of the Funsì chieftaincy conflict was because the issues in the conflict were very complex, dynamic, on-going and involved many factions and stakeholders with varying shades of opinions on the conflict’s root causes, effects, future, management and resolution strategies, and more significantly, not having quantitative data on the conflict as Acheampong (2010) affirmed that.

Notwithstanding that conflicts were not recent developments such as the Dagbon crisis between the Abudu and the Andani gates which erupted in 2002, the Ga Mantse succession dispute in 2007, the Anlo chieftaincy conflict in 2007, the Adoagyiri crisis in 2007, Princess and Aketeki towns’ troubles in 2007 (Prah and Yeboah, 2011), the Angloga conflict in the Volta Region (Acheampong, 2010), the case of Funsì chieftaincy was an exception for study because it had not been studied by any research irrespective of its renewed clashes in an area that was seen as the food hub of the upper west region of Ghana. However, some references to quantities or numbers were used for indicative purposes and were limited to observing patterns or tendencies.



3.4 Target Population

It is the entire aggregation of respondents the designated set of criteria. The target population in this study consisted of Sub-chiefs within the paramountcy, members of the contending gates, the kingmakers to Funsu skin, members of the District Security Council, members of the Regional Peace Council, members of Regional House of Chiefs, members of the District Assembly, Head teachers within the paramountcy, Nurses in the health facilities in the paramountcy, the District Agricultural Office (DAO) staff, Business people, residents of Funsu town and political party members.

3.5 Sample Size, Sampling Procedure and Technique

Sample is a sub-group of the population the researcher is interested in for a study to become the basis for estimating or predicting a fact, outcome, or a situation regarding the bigger group.

For this study, the researcher sampled 45 respondents from the target population as follows: Four (4) people each from the 3 contending royal gates making 12 participated in the study. The 8 community chiefs that made up the Funsu Traditional area participated in the study. Also, 1 representative each from the kingmakers, Wa East Assembly, District Security Council, and Regional Peace Council, Representative of the National Democratic Congress and New Patriotic Party, and District Agricultural Office staff were part of the study. The inclusion of only NDC and NPP were as a result of them been the dominant parties there. The study had intended to include a representative of NGOs in the District into conflict and peace building but there was no such organization in the district and therefore this was excluded.



Furthermore, 1 representative from the Funsu Senior High School, 2 head teachers of Junior High Schools, 1 head teacher of Primary Schools, 1 head teacher of a Kindergarten were part of the study. Also, 2 petty traders each from the feuding gates, 1 whole sale business person and the Funsu market leader (queen) were all included in the study. This gave a sample size of 45 to be used for the study as shown in table 3.1.

Table 3.1 Sample Size Breakdown Respondents

Sample Size Breakdown Respondents		Sample Size
1	One chief from each of the 8 communities of the Paramountcy	8
2	4 representatives from the three contending gates	12
3	A representative from the kingmakers	1
4	Representative of the District Security Council	1
5	Representative of Regional House of Chiefs	1
6	Representative of the Regional Peace Council	1
7	Representative from the District Assembly	1
8	Head teachers	5
9	Nurses in health facility within the paramountcy	4
10	Representative of District Agricultural Office staff	1
11	Business people	8
12	Representatives of NPP and NDC	2
Total		45

Source: Fieldwork, 2019



3.5.1 Sampling Method and Techniques

Non-probability sampling method was used. Here, respondents or subjects do not have an equal chance of being selected in the study. Non-probability sampling method was used because the sample is homogenous, sample frames do not exist and to enable the researcher gain preliminary knowledge of the study area. Two non-probability sampling techniques were used in this study. Purposive and Convenience sampling Techniques.

3.5.2 Purposive Sampling

This is a non-probability sampling technique that selects information rich cases for in-depth study. This technique was used to select the study area (Funsì Traditional Area) because Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict was an exception for study because it had not been given much attention. This sampling technique was again used to select representatives of Chiefs, Kingmakers, Head teachers, Nurses, Business people, members of the political parties, and WEDA staff respondents for the study.

According to Kusi (2012) “in purposive sampling, researchers intentionally select individuals and sites to learn or understand the central phenomenon. The standard used in choosing participants and sites is whether they are information rich”. Therefore, this allowed the researcher to select people with requisite expertise and competencies to share their in-depth intellect, thoughts and opinions on the issues under enquiry. This accounted why the research sought the perspectives and knowledge of kingmakers, chiefs in the study area, Regional House of Chiefs, members of the Regional and District Security Councils and Regional Peace Council. This offered the researcher a wide rich data that were all encompassing and adequate to understudy the chieftaincy conflict in FUTA.



3.5.3 Convenience Sampling

A Convenience sample results when the more convenient elementary units are chosen from a population for observation. In Convenience sampling, the primary criteria for selecting cases is that they are easy to reach, convenient, or readily available. This sampling method allowed the researcher to meet respondents at the District and Regional Security, Regional House of chiefs and Regional Peace Council members at their meeting grounds. This made members readily available for the study and those that were chosen still represented the sample units at the time. This sampling method was chosen because it allowed the researcher relatively easy way to meet respondents at a common geographical area at a particular time (Creswell, 2009; and Kusi, 2012).

3.6 Primary data collection techniques

A primary data source is an original data source that is one in which the data are collected first hand by the researcher for a specific research purpose or project (Neil J. Salkind 2010). The researcher used Semi-structured interview and key informant interview primary data for the study.

3.6.1 Semi-structured interview

Semi-structured interview schedule was used to solicit data from Sub-chiefs within the Traditional Area, representatives from the contending gates, representative from the kingmakers, Head teachers within the Traditional Area, nurses from the health facilities in the Traditional Area, representative of Ministry of Agriculture, business people, one representatives each for NPP and NDC which are in the researchers sample.

The researcher moved round to identify the respondents and then booked time that was convenient for each of the respondents. The researcher then followed the scheduled time with the respondents to mark the integrity and respect for the



respondents. The interview took 45 minutes to an hour with the respective respondents. The meticulous articulation to the issues that were under investigation determined how early a respondent interview could either use the least time of 45 minutes or the maximum time of an hour. The researcher managed the conversation and engagement with the respective respondents to a fruitful interview.

This instrument was used for the data collection which Kusi (2012: 45-46) indicated it offers “interviewees the opportunity to express their views, feelings and experiences freely, and the interviewers the freedom to divert from the items or questions in schedule to seek clarification”. Respondents share their views, feelings and experiences on specific issues that are under study (Babbie, 2010; Kusi, 2012). Semi-structured interview schedule afforded the researcher to ask a follow-up question(s) or vary the order of questions from respondent to respondent as a way to clarify answers and for information-rich to be solicited from respondents.

3.6.2 Key informant Interview

This is a qualitative in-depth interview with people who know what is going on in a community. These community experts, with their particular knowledge can provide insight on the nature of problems and give recommendations for solutions. This was used to elicit data from the representative of the District Security Council, representative of the Regional Peace Council, representative of Regional House of Chiefs, and representative from the District Assembly. Key informant interview allowed the gathering of unique knowledge and experiences that are relevant information on the conflict from people with the requisite and in-depth knowledge about the Finsi chieftaincy conflict which the researcher might not get from other respondents. According to Babbie (2010) the Key informants data gathered are



usually detailed and thorough which helps crosscheck and counterbalance to validate the data for the study.

3.7 Secondary Data

This was the second type of data source that the researcher relied on in the conduct of the research. The researcher solicited data from reports, appeal and other documentations from the District and Regional Security Councils, Regional House of Chief and Regional Peace Council in relation to the existing complexities and dynamics in the conflict in the Funsì Traditional Area. Some of the reports and documents included existing literature on Chieftaincy Conflicts, minutes of the arbitration on the Funsì Chieftaincy dispute held at Wa-Naa's Palace and past Judicial Committee rulings on similar disputes on the Funsì skin in the past.

These documents were obtained from some key informants in Funsì town. These documents aided the researcher to cross check some of the data solicited from the respondents.

3.8 Data analysis

Content and thematic analysis was used. The content analysis provided knowledge and understanding of the phenomenon to depict the magnitude of informants' perception about the Funsì Chieftaincy conflict while the thematic analysis on one hand aided to provide varied and shared interpretation of the content of text data (Babbie, 2010). Therefore, during the analyzes, the recorded data was transcribed first from the recordings into text and read to compare the text written concurrently with the recordings in the field whether there was any variations in the narration and wordings from experiences and opinions of the respondents. The data was sieved and categorized into themes by searching for recurrent ideas and patterns from the large amounts of data. Checks were made to glean inconsistent and irregularities in the data



appropriately in the patterns emerging for coding, analysis and results interpreted in relation to the objectives (Sandra, 2009). This helped the researcher to discover text finding that were relevant, reliable and rich in the research (Creswell, 2013; Neuman, 2012; Bryman, 2012; Goetz and LeComte, 1984).

According to Kusi (2012) “in purposive sampling, researchers intentionally select individuals and sites to learn or understand the central phenomenon. The standard used in choosing participants and sites is whether they are information rich”. Therefore, this allowed the researcher to select people with requisite expertise and competencies to share their in-depth intellect, thoughts and opinions on the issues under enquiry. This accounted why the research sought the perspectives and knowledge of kingmakers, chiefs in the study area, Regional House of Chiefs, members of the Regional and District Security Councils and Regional Peace Council. This offered the researcher a wide rich data that were all encompassing and adequate to understudy the chieftaincy conflict in the Funsì Traditional Area.

3.9 Ethical Issues in the Research

Ethical issues observed in this study included:

1. Informed consent. In conflict areas, information divulged for purposes such as research can compromise the security and safety of the respondents. As a result of the above, I made it a point to explain in detail the purpose of the research to each respondent, and made him or her understand that participation was on voluntary basis. The informed consent of each respondent was required for participation in this research.
2. Respect for persons as autonomous individual. Respect for persons is a basic human right. Respondents as autonomous individuals have the right to choose to either participate or not in the research. Respondents were allowed to act



independently by giving their informed consent to participate in the study without coercion.

3. Confidentiality and anonymity. Confidentiality is also a basic ethical principle while anonymity is one way in which confidentiality is maintained. To ensure anonymity, steps were taken to protect the identity of the respondents by neither writing their names during the data collection nor including identity details.



CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF STUDY FINDINGS

4.0 Introduction

This chapter focused on findings on the demographic characteristics of the study area, factors impeding the lawful installation of the Funsì Chief, Socio-economic effects of the Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict, Economic and Political effects of the Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict, mechanisms to resolve the chieftaincy conflict in the Funsì Traditional Area and application of the Theories used in the study.

4.1 Socio- Demographic Characteristics

The study found that 76% of the respondents were males with 24% of them being females. This is probably due to the fact that most of the respondents with in-depth knowledge about the study were males. Below is a summary of the distribution of respondents categorized in terms sex and percentage.

Table 4.1 Distribution of respondents.

SEX	PERCENTAGE
MALE	76%
FEMALE	24%

Source: Fieldwork 2019

This was followed by Educational status of respondents.



Table 4.2 Educational status of respondents

LEVEL OF EDUCATION	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS	PERCENTAGE
BASIC	3	6.7%
S.H.S	4	8.8%
TERTIARY	26	57.8%
NONE	12	26.7%

Source: Fieldwork, 2019

Knowledge of the educational background of respondents aided to provide a picture of employment status in the Traditional Area and also helped in the interpretation of data given by each respondent. The educational background of the sample shows that majority of the citizens of the FUTA are in tertiary and none categories.

Interestingly, more respondents are within the tertiary level (77.8%) than basic education (6.7%), this contradicts the official statistics from the Wa East District Assembly (WEDA).

This is probably due to the fact that most of the respondents were selected at the District capital that has a lot of formal workers which fell within this level. Significant percentage of respondents was teachers and nurses.

From table 4.2 the highest respondent of 57.8% had tertiary qualification, with 8.8% of the respondents attained Senior High School level, with 6.7% attaining Basic School level education and as 26.7% of respondents had no Educational Qualification. The 57.8% of respondents holding tertiary qualification probably could be that the



educated elites had overt interest in the chieftaincy title, as such this category of persons may fall within the middle and upper class that can fuel or calm tempers to limit reprisal attacks. They may wield the resource strength to their respective gates and may use that to create intermittent clashes in an attempt to overcome and silence the opposing gates. These classes of persons would usually be the ones who want the chieftaincy title and would exploit political, economic and the social capital they would be privileged to wield to help their course.

The 26.7% of respondents who had no educational qualification could be those that have often fall prey to the manipulation of the literates with the middle and upper class. These categories of persons with no educational background may be impoverish who may deemed one of their kind or closed associate from either from or outside their gate ascending to the skin as an opportunity for livelihood at the traditional area.

The study found that the respondents were from varied ethnic backgrounds. The findings show that 77.8% of the respondents were Sissaala, with second highest 11.8% being Dagaabas, with both Gonjas and Akans with same 4.4% and the least respondents were 2.2% in the study area. The 77.8% being Sissala meant that the largest respondents would be in a more informed position to speak to the dynamics of the conflict since they are the custodians of the Funsu Traditional Area and would understand the genesis of the conflict. The inclusion of the other tribes allows people who were professionals or business persons working in area to make their perspective known on how the conflict impact on their businesses and work.

The study further revealed the gates that the respondents belonged to as shown in table 4.3.



Table 4.3 Respondents from The Various Gate

NAME OF GATE	PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS
Balonosi	15.6%
Muliabee	11.1%
Kunkongibuni	57.8%
None	15.6%

Source: Fieldwork, 2019

The finding in Figure 4.3 showed that the highest respondents came from the Kunkongbuni gate with 57.8% respondents, followed by Gbeelonsi gate with 15.6% respondents with the Muliabee gate representing 11.1% respondents. Another 15.6% of the respondents indicated that they did not belong to any of the three contending gates battling for the chieftaincy title in the Funsì Traditional Area. The representation of respondents from the 3 contending gates showed varied opinions from the perspectives of each of the gates. The findings would touch and share light on the dynamics and angles of the Funsì Chieftaincy conflict. The 15.6% of respondents who did not belong to any of the gates showed that they had the potential of providing an unbiased and independent opinion on the issues of the conflict understudy. This would enhance the quality of the findings. The reasons that accounted for the higher percentage of respondents from the Kunongibuni gate were that, majority of the respondents to the study was as a result of their descendants occupying key sensitive positions that were part of the sample and also as a result of the fact that they are not contending to occupy the skin for now because the immediate passed chief was from that gate. They were seen as the tire breakers ones they not contending to occupy the title.



Furthermore, the researcher as part of the data collection from respondents, sort to know which of the gates were entitle to the skin. Knowledge about respondents perception as to the gate entitle to the chieftaincy title will help provide a picture of respondents perception about the chieftaincy title in the Traditional Area and also help in the interpretation of the situation.

Table 4.4 Gate entitle to the chieftaincy title

Gate	Frequency	Percentage %
Gbeelonsi gate	15	33.3
Muliabee gate	10	22.2
Kunkongbuni gate	3	6.7
None	17	37.8

Source: Fieldwork, 2019

The findings in Figure 4.4 showed that 33.3% of respondents felt that the chieftaincy title was due the Gbeelonsi gate, 22.2% respondents felt the Title was due the Muliabee gate, 6.7% respondents supported that the Kunkongbuni gate be given the title and the majority of respondents 37.8% felt that none of the gates was entitle to be honoured the Funsu Chieftaincy title. It was surprising to find that when alluded earlier that majority of the respondents of 57% were from the Kunkongbuni gate, it was noticed that a significant declined to 6.7% of respondents supported the



legitimacy of the candidature to occupy the Funsì Skin. It may well be the case that none of the Kunkongbuni gate's own members endorsed their own candidature and the 6.7% endorsement came from persons who did not come from any of the 3 feuding gates.

Also, the closeness of support of respondents of 33.3% for Gbeelonsi gate and 22.2% for the Muliabee gate to be the legitimate gates for the Funsì Chieftaincy Title meant that the two gates command loyalty from the people which could embolden them to fiercely contend for the Funsì Chieftaincy whether through lawful or unlawful means.

The case where majority of respondents 37.8% declined to support the legitimacy of the candidature for any of the 3 contending gates probably due to the volatility of the conflict which the respondents may not want to muddy the waters by taking side. Also, this could mirror how tired and fed up the people were with the conflict because of the toll the conflict had on them in the Funsì Traditional Area.

4.2 History and Origin of the Funsì people

A key informant interview revealed that:

The people of Funsì trace their history to Nalerigu. Their original settlement was at Gworuba/Gbanwagu which is by Gboruba River in Nalerigu. This was around the sixteenth (16th) Century when there were a lot of tribal wars and migrations. It is still believed that after death, their souls go to the 'Paribigo' River (Gbanwagu).

They claim it was due to chieftaincy conflict that made them to break away and migrated to their current settlement. Their route was as follows:

Nalerigu to Walewale, from Walewale to Yagiba, to Yabum, to Yiziasi. They continued their journey to 'Luri' at the Baglinbeebie River. Darkness fell on them and



they decided to sleep at Baglinbee River and to continue their journey the following morning.

The first settlers here were the Sagibalia people who were sissalas. They got up and met them and posed the question “Fon siile hu re nye”? Which translate as ‘Is that the people who said they would get up early’? This is how the name has been derived (FONSI) which is now spelt Funsì by the white man.

It is postulated that the Waala, s are the aunt’s children of the Funsì origin. Their intention was therefore to join the Wala group who also migrated from ‘Dgbon’ because of chieftaincy conflict. Their intention therefore was to continue their journey to meet the Wala Group.

It is a conjecture who was the real leader of the migration from Nalerigu. Different narrators trace it to their direct grandfather. My narrator claims it was “Fawaale” and others said it was Lanko. The fact is that Funsì had one head who led the migration from Nalerigu, and it was this man who gave birth to the grandparents of Kpanjangabee, Balonosi, Kunkongibee and Muliabee.

The leader of Funsì gave birth to four sons and these form the four sections of Funsì as listed above. The Kpanjangabee head was the most senior of the four and was therefore an automatic head of the Funsì Community that is Beetina (owner of the home). As such he is in charge of the village/community shrine that is the To-Tiina. They have therefore been the ‘Shrine Priest’ of the community up to date.

The three younger brothers form the Principal Gates of Funsì that is Balonosi, Kunkonbuni and Muliabee.



My informant said the Funsu leader at Nalerige had very serious challenges/problems and named his children in relation to those challenges. These include:

1. Gbe-leye-Nnusi- My hands are tied to my feet (Now Balonosi)
2. Nyuvirukunkonbung: If you have long life you will not lack any thing (Now Kunkongibee).
3. Mwun-Liahi-Nbisi: God change my people behavior (Muliabee).

My informants further said Balonosi and Kunkongbuni are of one mother and were together called 'Dachaga' but later separated to form the two gates (Balonosi and Kunkongibee). Muliabee is of a different mother and Kpanjangabee also of a different mother.

Kpanjangabee is an adulteration of "Kpama-lanaa", which means Spear bearer. He is in charge of the clan 'Shrine' and land God. It is believed that during this migration he was carrying their laguage, held the spear and led the migration. Where ever he fixes the 'Spear' and puts down his load everybody will stop there.

Kpanjangabee and Kunkusibee are also of one grandfather. Their father had a son who was too troublesome. At a point this son run away and the father did not know where he was, as such he was very worried and passed the comment: 'Ng Bie Nga Yaala Ng kun kpisi'. Because of this my son I cannot sleep. He prayed for the return of his son. When the son finally returned, he did not stay with his father and his other brothers but found his own home which was called 'Kunkpisi's home'. This is now a section in Funsu called Kunkusibee. They are assistant 'Shrine Priests' or assistant Beetina.



Kunkpisi formed his own ‘Shrine’ (god) and said his shrine/god was stronger than his father’s ‘shrine’ (god) which is ‘Wuoto’.

Table 4.5 Traditional titles in Funsì

TITLE	SECTION
BEETINA/TO-TINNA	KPANJANGABEE
SIKPARI/ASSISTANT BEETINA	KUNKUSIBEE
KUSIAU	BALONOSI AND KUNKONBUNU
NANDUGU	BALAONOSI AND KUNKONBUNI
KPARIBOGO	MULIABEE
SUARI	MULIABEE
ASIMA (WAR CAPTAIN)	MULIABEE



Traditional sharing is according to the mother line. If there is something to be shared, Balonosi and Kunkongibee will have one share, Kpanjangabee and Kunkusibee will have one share and Muliabee will have one share.

The Funsì people have one taboo which is dry flour (flour which is not soaked in water). They are therefore called ‘Munviala’ (those who taboo dry flour).

4.2.1 Funsì Moslems (Yalia Bee)

They are of Mali origin. They come from a community in Mali called Kantonsi and have since been called Kantonso.

They were invited by Kuoro Bakuli to come and support his leadership with prayers. As such Mondays and Fridays are special prayer days at the chief's palace.

The first Moslem in Funsì was Mahama. They have now multiplied to form a section/large compound in Funsì.

Apart from prayers and advice to the chief they also play a key role in the outdooing and installation of a Funsì Kuoro and as such are one of the key figures among the 'King Makers'.

After the traditional performances they perform the final prayers and put the gown on the chief elect. Their presence is also required during the chief's funeral. They have to bath the corpse and say prayers for him before he is buried. The Malam is one of the first consultants of the chief.

4.2.2 The Najamia/Bogie

The Funsì people met the Najanmia at the current site. They met them speaking Sissaali. They claim they have the same origin with the Bogie people.

They are claimed to be among the early migrants from the Mali/Sudan Empires. This was around Bornu in the Sudan Empire. Probably they were among the people who resisted Islam and migrated southwards and then westwards. It is postulated that they might have brought the Sissaali dialect from where they migrated.



Other historians postulate they are of Mapurusi origin that migrated earlier and might have met Sissaala spoken people from whom they adopted the language from.

The Bogie people claim they migrated with the Wala Group. They settled first at Yiziesi and later moved to the current site. They claim they are of the same clan with the 'Yijila' in Wa.

They also claimed to be among the first people to settle here. However, they settled across the 'Fuobibal' River and nearer to the 'Kulpawn' River. Their old settlement is found there which is 'Yiziesi Jikpie'. It was later on they moved to join the Najamia people in Funsu here.

The Funsu people met the Najamia and Bogie people here (current Funsu) and they are therefore the land lords (Land owners). They had independent chiefs from that of Funsu.

The whole clan is now extinct and only a few of them are now left. Probably they have been sold into slavery, or killed/exterminated due to inter-tribal wars/raids at that time.

They claim they were around here with Gbowiile, Dakuala and Sambuala. The Sambuala settled across the Kulpawn River (Wahabu.) who is now part of Kajokperi. The Gbowiilee are also now at Duu-West (Nyinban-Duu)

4.2.3 Janiabee

The Janiabee people in Funsu are from Sawuobee. When their counterparts were moving to the current Sawuobee, they decided to stay back.



Oral tradition had it that, they first settled around the District Assembly and moved to their current location to avoid slave raiders. It was believed that they have a god that can conjure a lot of millet or could provide good yield of millet. This was interpreted as “Jiang-namia” resulting in the name Janiabee/ Janiabalia.

They are some of the Princes of Sawuobee skin.

4.2.4 Procedure for Nominating and Installing Chief’s in Funsì

After the final funeral performance of a chief, the Reagent calls the kingmakers together and hands over the administration of the village to the “Beetina” (owner of the community). The Beetina then ask the kingmakers to find him a candidate. All the kingmakers then nominate a candidate and present him to the Beetina who in tend accepts him if he is the only one and presents him to the traditional council in Wa through the Wa-Naa for gazetting.

After this, the chief elect is presented to the District Chief Executive who is the government’s representative to decorate him with the medallion. If they are two and the issue cannot be resolved, the issue is referred to the Wa-Naa or the traditional council for resolution.

4.2.5 Emergence and History of Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict

Chieftaincy conflicts in Funsì are not recent development but started since 1920. This was after the death of “Kuoru” Dingani Baduong where Balonosi gate did not consult any other gate and connived with the “Beetina” to install Bolili Awuro as the new chief.



This was contested by Kuori Tampuori from the Kunkongibuni gate that led to the distoolment of Bolili Awuro and was installed as the chief. This did not satisfied Bolili Awuro and he also fought back, distooled Tampuori and was re-installed.

Four years later, Kofi from Kunkongibuni gate also distooled Bolili Awuro in 1924 installed as a chief and died in 1939.

After Kuori Kofi's death, Awuro Bolili from the Balonosi gate contested with James Dumah's grandfather from the Muliabee gate and defeated James grandfather on health grounds. He ruled from 1940-1970.

After the death of Kuori Awuro Bolili in 1970, Hilia from the same Balonosi gate was installed without any consultation from the other two gates. He also ruled from 1971-1978.

Kuori N-wadei Bayong also assumed the rain in 1978-2001. This was without misunderstanding. His regime witnessed the most prolonged dispute in the history of chieftaincy disputes in Funsu. His authority was challenged by Mimuni Siafu from the same Kunkongibuni gate and D.K. Togdia from the Balonosi gate.

Currently, Mr. James Dumah who was declared by the Wa Traditional Council as the legitimate person to occupy the skin in May, 20005, is been challenged by Mr. D.K. Togdia and Mr. Alhajj Nuhu Baduong at various levels. He was declared the rightful person in 01/05/06 and there has not been absolute peace in Funsu.

It is on record that from 1906 to 1920, there was peaceful installment of chiefs in Funsu and from the end of 1920 to date; there has not been peaceful installment of chiefs in Funsu.



Since the inception of the chieftaincy institution to 2005, Funsu have had fifteen (15) chiefs. Four (4) of these chiefs were elected at Nalerigu and eleven (11) at present day Funsu. From the list shown below, the first four were enskinned at Nalerigu, the fifth at Funsu Jikpie while the last remaining nine (9) were at present day Funsu. The names of these chiefs were;

1. Basin Sampuo I, 2. Nyukawia Mwaninwaye I, 3. Sali Sabalun-Namalitege, 4. Kuoribin Karinyama I, 5. Kupiahol Bakuli Masun, 6. Bakuli Kumpe 7. Namali Batong 8. Dingani Baduon Sampuo II 9. Bakuli Fayado Tampuori Lansagri I 10. Ajiaban Bolili Deujangbenge I 11. Kofi Mosun II 12. Bolili Awuro Kurikanyama II 13. Sampuo Hilia Sabalun I 14. Nwade Bayong 15. James Dumah

(An interview with a key informant)

From the response or the narration of this key informant, it suggests that, the natives of Funsu are of Mampurisis origin and not of Sissaala origin. The names of the principal gates or sections were in line with this (Kpama lana, Gbee-leye Nnusi, Nkun kpisi, Mwini lianbiisi and Nyuviri Kunkonbuni).

Again, the narration that the people of Wa are the aunt's children of the Funsu descendants could also be the reason for their association to the Waala Traditional Area. Also, the unsuccessful installation of any Chief with without stiff opposition from other contending gates indicated that, the Conflict or Dispute is a century matter and need serious attention to resolve it once and for all.



4.3 Factors Impeding the Lawful Installation of the Funsì Chief

The study revealed that the impeding factors of the Funsì chieftaincy conflict were varied as shown below

Table 4.6 Impeding factors of the Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict

Factors	Frequency	Percent	Rank
Inadequate documentation on succession route	13	28.8	1 st
Not complying with tradition	10	22.2	2 nd
Mistrust	8	17.8	3 rd
Poverty	5	13.3	4 th
Politics	5	11.1	5 th
Ascribed nature	2	4.4	6 th
Self-aggrandizement	1	2.2	7 th

Source: Fieldwork, 2018

Table 4.1 shows the inadequate documentation on succession route ranked as the first factor or cause of the Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict by 28.8% of the respondents. A representative of the Kingmakers said that:

There is nothing showing how the skin rotates including those gates that are qualified. In the past, chieftaincy matters in Funsì were kept in secrecy and the generation did not anticipate that misunderstanding and conflict would ever arise in the succession route to the Funsì Chieftaincy Title. It was such that they could have had a written document on the rightful person's qualification, selection and installation as a chief in the Funsì paramountcy. This left the non-royals with no locus to be considered in the qualification, selection and installation as the chief contesting for the position on the Funsì



skin. So, the wealthy persons who wield the influence are capitalizing on the lack of documentation on the succession route to change the succession tradition”

(Interview with Kingmakers, 3rd March, 2019).

Gbeelonosi gate representative noted that:

Due to the lack of documentation on the succession route, the persons involved want to use that opportunity to twist the tradition to their favors. People in the past did not foresee the disagreements over who should become the next chief and did not document the succession guidelines down. Also, high illiteracy rate has prevented the older generation from documenting down the succession processes, qualifications and procedures

(Interview with Gbeelonosi gate representative, 3rd March, 2019).

The finding above implied that records on the succession routes are not kept for reference and the one to succeed the sitting chief is usually unknown. As such leaves no clear succession lineage on written document and the contending gates tend to struggle for entitlement to the chieftaincy title in the Funsì Traditional Area. Once the Funsì Traditional Area has no watertight records as to the one who succeeds a sitting chief or the next family to become chief, it would be very difficult to select a chief after his death and therefore, people would infiltrate. Even the gates that ought to use the legal system in contending for the title would have inadequate documents to prove their claim on the succession route. The lack of documentation as to the qualification and procedure of occupying the Funsì skin when an incumbent chief passes on causes the Funsì Township to witness scuffles among the contending gates in their quest to



ascend to the skin. Therefore, the feuding gates would continue to compete to undo one another and the gate that overpowers the others would impose itself on the area as the true royal to ascend to the high skin as the overlord. This situation leads to falsification of documents when an incumbent chief passes on or is distooled.

Also, not complying with tradition had 22.2% endorsement from the respondents which ranked as the second factor causing the Funsí Chieftaincy conflict. The Muliabee gate representative affirmed that:

“the customs and traditions have been sidestepped and not adhered to, which is now a curse on us just because of modernization. We the Muliabee gate are not interested seeing our son been installed as the chief of Funsí by all means, but for the other royal gates to agree that, our gate is a legitimate royal gate to the Funsí skin. We have been vindicated by the ruling of the Wa Traditional Council on 1st May, 2006”.

(Interview with Muliabee gate representative, 18th March, 2019).

Gbeelonosi gate representative said:

‘many people do not want to follow laid down traditions of becoming a chief. The tradition on the enskinment of chiefs in Funsí had been violated with impunity. The disregard for the tradition in filling a vacant position when the need arises by some gates is a major cause of the Funsí Chieftaincy conflict’

(Interview with Gbeelonosi gate representative, 18th March, 2019).



Kunkongbuni gate representative said:

“every culture has a way of nominating chiefs which is being laid down by the forefathers which in some cases not followed in our tradition. The gates are not respecting the tradition of the Funsì town and are pushing their leaders to circumvent and rewrite the history, if not, what is wrong for someone to reclaim been given to purposely because he did not have it use at the time?”

(Interview with Kunkongbuni gate representative, 4th April, 2019).

A kingmaker said:

‘The contending gates defy the tradition with the perception that we the kingmakers are not fair and do not follow the right succession route on the Funsì skin. Due to their desire to ascend to the skin by all possible means, they are refusing to acknowledge the fact that the kingmakers traditionally have the right to enskin a chief.’

(Interview with kingmaker representative, 4th April, 2019).

From the statement, it could be that the feuding gates often circumvent and violate the tradition in their bid for the Funsì Chieftaincy title. Each of the feuding faction cries foul that the other contenders are subverting the tradition and never admits same to their side. Meanwhile the complaining gate(s) often want to usurp the turn of the other gate(s) to assume the title as a way of preserving the gate they belong, and not to be wiped off from the history of the royal gate of the Funsì skin. Each gate fights for the identity of its gate pushing away the tradition in a way to be installed the chief in the town. The gates were pushing away the rightful tradition to installing successor to the skin in the Funsì paramountcy making it as though the elders do not even know the



customs anymore. Once the gates were resorting to different things that suite the parochial course of their respective gates, these have the potential of adulterating the customs and some practices once disputed by the conflicting gates may even be lost. The refusal by the contending gates and all those who matter in filling the vacant skin failure to follow the tradition through consensus is due to their entrenched positions in the matter. This could also be as a result of the attention chiefs nowadays receive from political authorities and development agents.

Furthermore, Mistrust had 17.8% endorsement of the respondents as the third most important factor causing the Funsí chieftaincy conflict. This is probably due to the fact that during the dispute, members of the contending gates may have stepped on each other's toes and the suspicion that the eventual occupant of the skin could want to use the position to revenge or pay back.

Regional House of Chiefs representative noted that:

“The contending gates tend to be suspicious of one another and do not know what each of them could do to the other should one occupies the skin. The possible vengeance became the ultimate misconception the gates share about what may happen should the other gate have the chance. They then tend to thwart the efforts of one other from becoming the chief such that none gets to exercise and practicalize the negative perceptions they hold against one another’.

(Interview with Regional House of Chiefs representative).

As a sub-chief succinctly kept it:

‘the contending gates have long standing misconceptions about one another for a long time and as such the different gates have no trust in one another



following the constant misunderstanding whenever there is a vacancy. To the extent that some of the gates are feeling that, their gates will be eliminated from the succession line should certain gates have the opportunity to occupy the skin". (An interaction with a sub chief).

These feelings in my view have polarized the Funsì Traditional area to the extent that there is mistrust among all the gates and sections in Funsì with respect to which gate is the true royal and eligible for the throne. This brings about a feeling of insecurity in the community and this keeps fuelling the long standing conflict in the town. Each of the gates held the firm believe that its gate would be victimized should the opponent occupies the skin. So, the contenders suspect one another and as such do not have confidence in the other. The uncertainty about what may happen to their gates if a different gates occupies the position is herculean task since none of the gates can predict what the other could do to them should they have the opportunity.

The perception that whoever becomes the chief would be bias towards the gates of their opponents is what is making the choice of a successor difficult. The opponents are not certain of the neutrality or fairness of the gate permitted to ascend to the throne. This has poisoned

This confirms Issifu and Asante (2015) stands that there was mistrust among gates of chieftaincy conflict and usually oppose vehemently any plans of their contenders in the restoration of peace and tranquility. As a result, Bukari et al., (2017) further agreed that things that could be done within a shorter time get lengthy or may not be done at all (Bukari et al, 2017).





Poverty was ranked as fourth factor causing the chieftaincy conflict in Funsì with 13.3% affirmation of the respondents. The deficit in employable skills couple with the scarcity of jobs rendered people jobless and pushing them to fight for the skin, as the saying goes ‘the devil finds work for the idle hands’. The youth are poor and are being used by certain individuals. The inability of majority of the youth to acquire their basic needs makes them see the chieftaincy title as a panacea to their poverty. Many of them see the position as a means of alleviate their poverty. Being a paramount chief of the Funsì Traditional Area does not only come with responsibilities but access to power and resources that one get to appropriate. The contending gates and their supporters get to feel that becoming a chief attracts wealth in the community. Therefore, they want to assume the title and use the position to overcome their poverty. The feuding gates think being a chief is wealth, so many want to change their destiny through the position as they hope to enrich themselves. The few who are rich individuals intends to consolidate their riches by assuming the Funsì chieftaincy title.

Politics had 11.1% of the respondents’ endorsement and ranked as the sixth influential factor causing the Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict. The responses from respondents about politics and the chieftaincy dispute suggest that, the conflict is beginning to take political dimension and this could be dangerous.

A key informant in Funsì said that:

“Some politicians are now meddling in our chieftaincy matters now by providing legal aid to some of the factions now. Why did you think the culprits of the rosewood saga in town were set free? Politics is working in this case”

(Interview with Key Informant on 29th March, 2018).

As a result, leading political figures sometimes make statements that suggest their support for a particular gate(s) as well as prejudice against the other gate(s) just for the purpose of obtaining votes on the side of the politician(s) vying for political power.

Furthermore, proportion of the respondents has also identified the Ascribe nature of chieftaincy as a factor that impedes the installation of a chief in Funsì. It is ranked as the sixth factor causing the Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict representing 4.4% of the respondents. Though it represented a smaller portion, it could cause havoc or shoot up in future if an amicable solution is not found to the conflict.

Representative of the kingmakers said:

‘Some of the gates believed that they are the only people qualified for the skin. This is because the various gates whose turn was not it to ascend to the skin arrogated themselves to the title even when that was a breach of the procedure according to the traditions of the Funsì Traditional Area. Others have strong believes that, they are the only qualified persons to occupy chieftaincy status’.

Confirming this Sub Chief said that:

Some individuals from certain gates have the notion that they are the only people that must occupy the chieftaincy position and therefore, the chief must always come from their side. These gates have the feeling that, they have the power to install any person as a chief without consulting others due to their positions. This is the mentality of some individuals that ascending to the skin
Meanwhile the chieftaincy institution in the Traditional Area has given the



powers to the kingmakers on the tradition for qualifying, selecting and installing a chief “

(Interview with Sub Chief, 3rd March, 2018).

From the Kingmaker's assertion some of the feuding gates try to subvert and outwit the laid down tradition of qualifying, selecting and installing a chief in the Funsí Traditional Area. This usually comes when the perpetrators think that they have the wherewithal to use the legal technicalities and in circumventing the procedures. Gates that is politically aligned and is fortunate that their party is in power tends to use their political lineage to foment the troubles in the conflict. They often think of having the political backing closer is an antidote to ascending to the skin even when the tradition forbids that. So the gate(s) perceived to be at the losing side would rise against the penetrators that tried to bypass and usurped the opportunity to occupy the Funsí Chieftaincy title. These result in the renewed armed clashes leading to the rippling effect of injuries, trauma, deaths, scaring and warding off public officials and business people from the Funsí Traditional Area.

From the understanding of the Sub-chief assertion, it could be that the Funsí Conflict is witnessing these renewed clashes because certain families thought that they were entitled to the chieftaincy titled and should always have son of theirs selected by the kingmakers and installed as the chief. The feeling that one side was the only royal gate makes such a gate feel they were superior to the other gates when it came to chieftaincy title in the Traditional Area. They could hold the perception that the position should be for the high class of people like them irrespective of their gate. So, such gates wanted to ascend to the throne even when it was not their turn just because



they had in mind that, they were the only people to become chiefs in the traditional area. This notion would definitely not be allowed to fester by the opposing gates since that would always be deemed to have a bad precedence and eliminate others from being included in the succession route.

Self-aggrandizement was ranked as the least factor causing the chieftaincy conflict in Funsɔ occupying the seventh position with 2.2% respondents. Self-aggrandizement here refers to a situation where some individuals in Funsɔ feel they have acquired a lot in society and have to ascend to the chieftaincy position or title for people to recognize them or to enable them execute their personal agenda.

Regional Peace Council Representative in supporting the above view of the respondents said that:

‘People interested in the skin tend to influence others to support their bid for the title even when they might not be eligible gate or eligible personality within the qualified gate to occupy the throne. The interested parties use the position, wealth and status they wield as an avenue to sway the contenders, kingmakers and the subjects in the contest for the title’.

(Interview with Regional Peace Council Representative, 13th May, 2019).

This affirms that the selection of the qualified gate and eligible person from the qualified gate comes under intense machination and arm twisting as a way to project and gratify oneself even when not in accordance with the laid down tradition. People feel proud and desired to be called chiefs. So whatever means they will use to be bestowed with the title is not a matter of worry to them. They would bypass others to seek for the throne and this stokes the conflict. Self-actualization makes people fill





that because of their level of education, richness and social capital makes the gates and certain personalities within the gates think they are deemed more qualified and supposed to become the chief. The feuding gates always try to flaunt wealth to further the personality cult and interest and be the legitimate chief of Funsì paramountcy by all means which is unacceptable. Greed and selfishness is pushing people to engage in the conflict in order to achieve their personal gains. Others imposed themselves and lord it over the gate(s), followers and the Traditional Area in general in furtherance of their personal interest. The defiance of procedural process probably could be as a result of the lack documentation on succession route and Non-complying with tradition in the Traditional

4.4 Socio-Cultural Effects of the Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict

The study found that the Funsì chieftaincy conflict had numerous social-cultural effects on the lives of the inhabitants in the Funsì traditional Area. The effects identified from respondents are presented below:

Injuries and deaths were identified as one of the socio-cultural effects of the Funsì chieftaincy conflict. The perennial violence usually claims several lives while several others sustain various degrees of injuries. On the 6th of September, 2005, it was reported that one person died and another received injuries in Funsì Chieftaincy Dispute. (GNA, 6 Sep. 2005). Respondents also claimed that lot of mysterious deaths are either not reported or are played down by the authorities to reduce the tensions. They however maintained that in every major violent outbreak, several people are injured. In supporting this, a respondent said that:

during violent clashes in this conflict, guns and machetes are used to inflict wounds, pains and even deaths of innocent and unfortunate ones. This conflict

recorded the deaths of two people, one from the ‘Beetina’ section and a lady from the Gbeelonosi section”.

From the interviews, respondents reported that many families are losing their relatives, friends, spouses, parents and bread winners through the conflicts. As many of them get killed or injured during violent confrontations, this drains the pocket of relatives in organizing funerals and caring for the dependents of the deceased. This has brought financial hardships on the affected households, families and relatives. To support this, a respondent also said this: *“the children of the man who lost his life during this chieftaincy conflict are now burden to the entire family now”.*

Also, trauma was another social-cultural effect of the Funsu Chieftaincy conflict that respondents mentioned. This is an emotional response to a terrible event like an accident, rape, or natural disaster. Immediately after the event, shock and denial are typical. In supporting this, a respondent said that:

“as a victim of one of the chieftaincy dispute clashes that ensued between my gate and one of the gates, I am struggling with an injury sustained on my head and could still not explain to my children about how it happened to me”.

(An interview conducted on 09/03/19)

This signifies that the Funsu chieftaincy conflict has made the inhabitants not to feel safe and secured particularly the women and children were afraid and even panic for fear of been raped or molested in any renewed clashes. Any disagreement between the feuding parties had often been twisted, fuelled and scaled up in the line of the chieftaincy dispute. Respondents made mentioned that some of the security men who are usually send to the community to maintain law and order sometimes engage in



immoral acts such as rape, molestation, torturing and periodic shooting that could cause trauma to residents. To back this claim, a sub-chief from the FUTA said that:

“I was compelled as an opinion leader to complain to the DCE at a time about the negative acts some of the security officers were doing”.

This was in consonance with Bukari et al., (2017) idea that conflicts made the victims emotional leaving them bitter, hostile and divisive among the combatants due to the division within their ranks.

Another socio-cultural effect of the Funsì Chieftaincy conflict was that it renders people homeless during the renewed clashes. Data from the field indicated that, the chieftaincy conflict has rendered some people in the town homeless either through deliberate burning down of houses by opposing gates or through the sacking of tenants who are perceived to be opponents by their landlords. In confirming this, a businessman said that:

“ I am now living in this single room because the chamber and hall I used to occupy previously is closer to one of the contending gates whose youth have on many times warned me not to bring a lady I am now married to their area because she was related to one of the contending individuals to the chieftaincy title else, they will physically assault her and burn down the house. With this, I have no option than to leave there”

(Interview on 10/03/19).

This meant the clashes inflamed tensions, displaced members of families which are a threat to peaceful co-existence of the people of the Funsì Traditional Area. This raised insecurity and the respective gates contending for the title would not be able to offer





shelter and other support to the displaced opposing gate(s). This could lead to people sleeping outside which can lead to peer group influence and pressure on few houses creating insecurity, increase in expenditure on security by the assembly, increase in social vices and stresses the limited incomes of families. These showed that the opposing gates inflicted pain in one another and that further impoverish the victims.

Forced migration was another socio-cultural effect of the Funsu Chieftaincy conflict in the Traditional Area. The general insecurity has a direct impact on the demography of the town. To escape the intermittent violence and its negative consequences, many people, especially the youth, are forced to relocate to relatively more peaceful parts of the country. Most of the respondents in the data collection claimed that they have been forced to flee the town at least once in the past because of violent clashes. Some held that they had returned to the community only recently, because of the long absence of any violent clash. Fresh clashes will probably have forced most of these people to flee once more. Most respondents also claimed that they know of several people who have fled the perennial violence to settle permanently in nearby towns and in the big cities of Accra and Kumasi.

Development of Infrastructural Facilities. Most respondents also claimed that development of infrastructural facilities in the Traditional Area has clearly been affected by the violent chieftaincy clashes. The ability of the government and the District Assembly to provide infrastructural facilities has been affected by the violent chieftaincy conflict. In an interview with the DCE of Wa East District, he said that:

“because of the high expenditures required to maintain security, the Assembly is unable to commit adequate resources to the provision of infrastructural facilities. It is also difficult to get central government to

provide the resources needed for such facilities because it already spends a lot of resources on the security of the District”.

(An interview with the DCE, on 19/03/19).

Collapsed social ties were another socio-cultural effect of the Finsi conflict. Social ties here refer to activities or events that bond or bring a group of people together. These include funerals, festivals, weddings, naming ceremonies, communal labour and among others. Majority of the respondents claimed the spirit of these social ties has diminished.

A sub-chief was of the view that:

‘the spirit of unity is diminishing in the community as the conflict has broken the cordial relationship among people in the community. The conflict makes people to stop attending funerals, weddings from opposite gate(s). The spirit of togetherness is greatly diminishing and the people of Finsi no more see themselves as one. Most people will fear to be closer to their friends from the opposite gates. There are divisions in the community and everybody now live an individualize life where everybody for him or herself and God for us all’.

(Interview with a sub chief, 16th January, 2018).

This was confirmed by the District Chief Executive when he admonished:

‘the conflict has destroyed the “TanhaViali” festival instituted by the South Sissaala Tertiary Youth Association (SOSTYA). The festival which used to be celebrated annually and brings together tertiary students from the traditional area has not been celebrated for the past three (3) years due to the conflict. The conflict has also relegated the position of chiefs in the traditional area to the background. This is so because people nowadays do not follow chiefs to



durbar grounds, funerals and the authority of chiefs in settling disputes was waning. The vacant Chieftaincy position in the traditional area is affecting a whole lot of issues ranging from adjudication of disputes, supervising the installment of divisional and sub-chiefs in the Traditional Area. The conflict made the traditional area to look like children without father”

(An interview with the DCE, 19 th March, 2018).

The complaints of the respondents suggest that the conflict is hampering the valuable contributions of the chieftaincy institution in the Traditional Area and the culture of the people.

To conclude on the Socio-cultural effects was Social Services. Many of the respondents claimed that the dispute in the Traditional Area has also affected healthcare delivery and education. The health effects of the violent clashes include deaths, injuries, ill health and psychological disorders among the residents of the town. The situation places a lot of stress on the limited health infrastructure and personnel. A nurse claimed that:

“during the outbreak of violence, scores of people are rushed to the clinic with several degrees of injuries such as cutlass wounds, guns wounds and injuries from poisoned arrows”.

Most of these he claimed either die or are maimed.

The escalation of violence also limits access to health facilities. During such times, the disruption in the transportation network means that many people are not able to access health facilities when they need to do so. In addition, some respondents also claimed health workers are unable to go to work during such times for fear of exposing themselves to the violence and most health workers also refuse posting to Funsì. Some of those already there frequently request for transfers to other places.



It also became evident from the fieldwork that the conflict negatively affects education in Funsì as well. A teacher in Funsì asserted that:

“Anytime violence erupts schools are closed down because of the fear that the violence might spread there”.

From the evidence gathered from the field, the inability of residents to access basic social services like health and education could have serious consequences on the people especially the younger generations. These consequences include deteriorating health conditions, premature deaths, and falling standards of education, high school dropout rate, higher unemployment rate and high level of illiteracy rate if the root causes of the conflict in the Traditional Area.

4.5 Economic Effects of the Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict

Relocation of Economic Activities. It became evident from the fieldwork that not only do people relocate to other places, but they relocate their businesses and other economic ventures to more peaceful parts of Ghana as well. For instance, the Catholic Mission who was instrumental in infrastructural development and opening opportunities for residents moved such initiatives to different places. Most respondents also held that, the chieftaincy conflict have not only made it risky to do business in the Funsì town, but also ensures that few people have money to spend. This significantly affects businesses in the town as demand for goods and services go down, many businesses are left with little option but to relocate. The relocation of economic activities could cause underdevelopment in the community. To support the relocation of economic activities, a respondent said that:

“The reason why Funsì continued to remain the way it was is as a result of the chieftaincy conflict that is driving away potential investors”





Dwindling food production was noticed as an economic effect of the Funsì Chieftaincy conflict. The violence resulting from the chieftaincy conflict adversely affects production, marketing and investment in agriculture, the dominant economic activity in the Funsì Traditional Area. During outbreak of violence in the town, farmers, especially those engaged in the cultivation of perishable foodstuffs such as watermelons, okro and tomatoes suffer heavy losses. Some crops need constant tendering. When violence breaks out, most farmers are forced to abandon their crops because they fear being either attacked. Furthermore, the transportation networks are also disrupted during violent clashes and farmers are unable to transport their foodstuff to the market places. These results in the foodstuffs getting rotten on the farms, the markets are deprived of these produce, scarcity sets in while their prices soar in the area and the country as a whole. To substantiate this claim, a businessperson said that:

‘the violent conflict of Funsì disrupts transportation network. The lorry station in Funsì becomes very difficult for people from the other gates to access it whenever they are travelling. Also, in times of renewed clashes, drivers and transport owners do not want to move to the area for fear of being attacked. People do not feel safe bringing their cars to the area making it very difficult for passengers to access means of transport. When it happens in this way, travelers suffer. People with means of transport run away to places where there are no such difficulties’

(Interview with business representative, 13th May, 2019).

This is in contrast with Pra and Yeboah (2011) confirmation that during conflict, vehicular transport cease to operate for fear of being attacked or arriving late and

breaking curfew which could result in a fine or manhandling by security personnel on patrols because in the case of Funsì, it was passengers from opposing gates that are prevented from accessing the bus terminal by the gate closer to it.

Violence and insecurity in the community has also resulted in most financial institutions unwilling to grant loans to farmers to invest in production because the violence and insecurity increases the risk factor of such loans.

The DAO interviewed claimed that, the conflict results in many young people relocating to other places.

It became evident from some respondents that farmers who have their farms at the outskirts of the town have been greatly affected by the perennial violence. During violent clashes they are unable to visit their farms, and so most of them have had to give up farming altogether.

Gbeelonsi representative observed that:

‘the Funsì Traditional area is a predominant farming community, unfortunately the conflict made each of the factions unwilling to release land, machines and even inputs to the opponents.

(Interview with Gbeelonosi gate representative, 20th May, 2019).

Similarly, the Muliabee gate representative said that:

“when the Funsì Chieftaincy conflict degenerate into violence everybody run for their dear lives, so nobody cares of farming and rearing of animals, which could decrease the production of food and heightens food insecurity in the Traditional area”.

(An interaction with Muliabee gate representative, 16th March, 2019).



The implication of this effect is that, it could lead to food insecurity in the area once many potential farmers are folding up due to difficulties they are encountering.

Revenue Generation and Collection was also an economic effect of the Funsì chieftaincy conflict. Revenue collection is an important component of every organization to perform its functions optimally. In addition to funds received from central government in the forms of the District Assembly Common Fund, Grants-in-Aid, and Ceded Revenue. The District Assembly relies on revenues generated internally through the collection of levies, property taxes, and duties to finance its budget. Revenue generation and collection is another important aspect of the District economy that has been adversely affected by the chieftaincy conflict.

The DCE of Wa East held that:

“the ability of the assembly to collect revenues in Funsì has been severely affected by the protracted chieftaincy conflict”.

A respondent for instance claimed that, “some of the contenders regard themselves as royals and to them royals do not pay taxes”. This claim was confirmed by some of the kingmaker’s respondents. Some other businessmen also refuse to pay since paying the taxes in the face of the supposed royal’s refusal might be construed as accepting their claim that, it is non-royals who pay tax. The general economic decline in the town as seen above, also negatively affects revenue collection and mobilization in the District, as there are few productive ventures to tax.

Price hike was another economic effect of the Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict in the Traditional area. A market woman interviewee who does business in the Funsì Township said that:



‘any time the Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict degenerates into clashes, shops remained closed for fear of looting and attacks. People struggle to purchase what they want to buy since the opposing gates cannot reach out to the opponents to buy goods sold by the opponents. It is just for fear of the unknown from the opponents. So even when the opponent’s side is the only source within the Funsì Traditional area that the goods or services can be obtained, it is difficult for the opposing gate to accept to approach the other contending side let alone to patronizing the goods or services’.

(Interview with a market woman in Funsì, 13th April, 2018).

This could probably constrain the well-meaning indigents and inhabitants to do businesses particularly those who earn their livelihood from businesses.

As they belong to different gates some will refuse to do business with one another because of much suspicion and mistrust.

Low sales were also identified as one of the economic effects of the chieftaincy conflict. Many of the businesspeople claimed that they experience low sales whenever the conflict reignites. A business person supported this claim with the following statement:

“In times of confrontations, people from the surrounding communities do not come to the Funsì market and this affects businesses. It usually prevents traders from Wa and Tumu too from coming to trade in the market”

(Interview with a business woman, 23rd May 2018).



Another businesswoman also that:

“When the conflict erupts, we lose customers from the opposite side of the gate. Only few customers could go to their opponent’s side to buy items for fear of attacks”.

The implication could be that, it slows down business activities and could also leads to collapse of businesses.

The findings also identified Loss of labour force as an economic effect that the inhabitants of the Funsì Traditional area have to be faced with. Confirming this, the Gbeelonsi Gate representative in an interview noted that:

‘as the Funsì Chieftaincy conflict often degenerates into violence, some members of each faction involved in the conflict sustained wounds, get killed and others forced to run away from the Funsì Traditional area’.

(Interview with Gbeelonosi representative, 17th March, 2019).

This entailed that when the Funsì Conflict slipped into violence, people in the community are displaced including young men, women, business persons and even public sector workers. Through this violent confrontation, the working population is lost through deaths, disability as well as migration from the FUTA.

This is in line with Marshall (2005) that upheld that the killing, emigration, displacement, arresting and detention or even imprisonment of people during conflict reduces the working class in conflict environment who would have helped work to increase productivity.



4.6 Political effects of the conflict in Funsì

The study further found that politicians are using the conflict to sustain their popularity, and influence the installation of new chief therefore, making the conflict complex. Some politicians from the area are meddling in the processes, as a result of the influence chiefs have on matters on elections these days. So most prominent politicians are interfering in the process to suit their preferred candidates. Even for fear of losing votes, politicians are afraid to do the right things that would bring permanent resolution of the chieftaincy conflict in Funsì. These politicians who need the support of the people back the gate(s) that would pay allegiance to them, unfortunately without thinking of the ramification. As a result, it has the under listed effects in the community which happens to be the District capital of WEDA.

- ❖ It became difficult getting consensus when citing developmental projects or facilities in the community.
- ❖ Monies were channeled to quell violent confrontation in maintaining peace.
- ❖ For fear of being tagged as taking sides, it was difficulty engaging or consulting stakeholders on certain critical matters pertaining to the development of the District.
- ❖ It was also contributing to low revenue mobilization.
- ❖ It makes the conflict murkier which pose a security threat.

4.7 Consequences of the above effects on people and on the entire District:

- ❖ The difficulty in getting consensus in citing projects in the town could lead wrong citing of projects and poor sustainability culture in Funsì.



- ❖ The channeling of monies into quelling violent confrontations probably could also lead to under development and over stretching the already over burden security personnel.
- ❖ May be difficult getting key stakeholders in the town to partner political leaders to lobby for developmental projects.
- ❖ Could affect internal generated funds mobilization and compelling District Assembly to be relying largely on central government funds.
- ❖ This could prevent independent state institutions like the police and URHCs to take independent decisions.

It was clear from some respondents that, some selfish politicians were taking advantage of the misunderstanding to support gates that they thought were loyal to them by providing resources. So, it was for both the politicians and feuding gates' selfish and personal gains that make the conflict to linger.

This supported Marshall (2005:11) assertion that the politicization of the chieftaincy institution is 'exclusionary politics and discrimination...Similarly, the more recent push to institute democratic reforms has often induced political leaders to court political support from loyal kin groups and broader ethnic support bases to help secure electoral victories, limit support for political rivals, and restrict the mobilization of potential challengers'.

4.8 Application of the 'Dahrendorf's Conflict and Relative Deprivation Theories'

Following the propositions of the Dahrendorf's and Relative Deprivation theories", the feuding factions in the Funsu chieftaincy conflict are to be seen as people in society who are searching for power to exercise authority over others that are attached



to the occupancy of the chieftaincy institution and the experience of being denied of chieftaincy title which the factions believed they are entitled to foisted or created the dispute since authority does not reside in individuals but in position. The discontent the factions have for not being in the chieftaincy position belittles them when they are compared to others holding the title.

When their expectations to become the Funsu “Kuoru” (Chief of Funsu) do not meet attainment, they then engage in conflict or dispute with those who they hold responsible for depriving them of the chieftaincy title. The dispute erupted because each of the factions to the conflict feels deprived of the skin (Ahiave, 2013).

The Relative Deprivation Theory in this context sees the failure of the factions to occupy the chieftaincy title as the unmet need which each of the gates is bent on achieving making the dispute intractable in nature and that the protracted nature of the conflict or dispute tends to affect society development. Thus, the Socio-cultural, Economic and Political effects on the residents of Funsu and the entire nation in general.

The prestige associated to chieftaincy titles in society and their influence to local development made the occupant of the skin (symbol of chiefly office) very powerful. The institution of chieftaincy therefore became coveted and an object of contention to be competed for and controlled between the contending gates in Funsu. Robbins and Judge (2012) asserted that once particular gates get the nod to occupy a chieftaincy title, the gate has legitimate power and the formal authority to control and use resources on behalf of the subordinates because the subjects have had the acceptance of the authority of the position.





The lack of employment opportunities in the Funsì Traditional Area can also be said to have exacerbated the conflict. Despite the vast fertile land in the area, the level of unemployment is very high in the District especially among the youth (Wa East District Medium Term Development Plan 2010-2019). This lack of economic opportunities has largely made the youth of the area from both factions disillusioned, and they have often sought to ensure that traditional governance in the town is controlled by their kin in the hope that when economic opportunities come they would be in a better position to access them. The result of this appeal to group solidarities is that the youth of both factions in the conflict are easily recruited by interest groups and financiers who have an interest in the continuation of the conflict. This explains why it is the youth who are most visible on the frontlines of the cycle of violent confrontations.

4.9 Suggested Mechanisms for Resolving the Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict

Wallenstein (2000) defines conflict resolution as getting the conflicting parties enter into an agreement that solves their incompatibilities and enable them to accept to continue to co-exist and cease all violent actions against each. The findings of the research have revealed the following mechanisms to the Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict:

Supernatural arbitration through oracles, sworn and herb drinking. This is a process whereby all the feuding parties agreed to abide by the supernatural arbitration through oracle, sworn and herbs drinking to prevent the non-royals, unqualified gates, litigants and disputants within the royal gates from routing for the title. This would ascertain and reveal the truth and prevent unqualified persons who want to force themselves into the succession route. Knowing the penalties one would face when caught, non-royals and unqualified individuals would have a second thought and not want to push

their way into the succession route. As the unqualified gates and individuals are exposed, the non-royals would be withdrawn from the competition and prevented from pulling their weight through. This puts fear in people who are not qualified to be chiefs yet nurturing that ambition, and therefore, some will definitely withdraw from the race to the title as shared by Ahiave (2013).

In supporting this mechanism, a kingmaker said that:

‘the gods and ancestors of the land know the true or legitimate person to occupy the Funsu Chieftaincy title. So, the traditional authorities in Funsu should let us subject all the contending parties to swear the gods of the community to ascertain the true royals of the Funsu skin. If you are not the right person to be the chief and fight for it, you may not last in the community. This would scare the non-royals to back down for fear of being punished by the gods and ancestors’

(An interview with a King maker in Funsu, 16th March, 2019).

Also, sensitization and public campaign was identified as a mechanism that could be used to resolve the Chieftaincy Conflict in the Funsu Traditional Area. A representative of the District Security Council said that:

“Ignorance is a bane to the resolution of the Funsu Chieftaincy conflict. It lures people to vow for their respective gate even if it meant to cost their lives. The challenge is that those who foment the trouble and stoke tension in the chieftaincy dispute of the Funsu Traditional area are being enticed and instigated by the privileged few whose interest is to assume the throne when the gate succeed’.

(Interview with a representative of the District Security Council, 19th March, 2018).





This implied that there entrenched positions, suspicion and mistrust among the contending gates create problems that fuel the Funsí Chieftaincy conflict. So, moving these parties from such positions to understand the nature of the conflict needs the commitment and cooperation from the parties. Getting this commitment and cooperation requires that the parties to the Funsí Chieftaincy Conflict be educated to understand the negative impact of the conflict to the Traditional area. This would enlighten the feuding parties on the consequences of the conflict. It would create the awareness of the people on the implication of the Chieftaincy conflict such that the conflicting parties would appreciate the need to promote peace and the need to give peace a chance in the Funsí and the entire Traditional Area. This would bring out the intriguing consequences of the conflict on the community and the people. People who are ignorant about the effects of the conflict will get to understand more.

The use of security forces was another antidote in resolving the Chieftaincy Conflict in the Funsí. A representative of the Kingmakers indicated that:

‘the police and military have always been used to foil violence occurrence in the Funsí Chieftaincy Conflict. They monitor to pick signals on any rising tension in the Funsí town. However, these security officers also have their weaknesses’

(Interview with a representative of kingmakers in Funsí, 30th April, 2019).

Some of the respondents claimed the ubiquitous role of the police has been exalted in dealing with internal security which is their core mandate. Except that in instances where the conflict is extending beyond the control of the police, then the military is brought in to assist. The security forces help to save lives and properties, and thereby maintain law and order when the feuding gates are up in arms in Funsí. This signified



that the continuous presence and use of security forces in the conflict area is the right way to go to reduce simmering tension in the Funsì Traditional area. Notwithstanding the critical role of the security forces, they are usually under public criticism for their brutal exertion of force in maintaining law and order in the Traditional area. Also, the security forces continue to face accusation of biasness from the contending gates in trying to take sides. This has the tendency to stall the amicable resolution of the Funsì Conflict since the security forces are deemed not to be neutral and professionally unethical.

Mbowura (2014) affirmed that the presence of the security at a conflict area help in identifying early warning to quell clashes, put fear in the combatants and compelled the factions to exercise restraint to avoid any explosive situation.

Use of legal system was found to be one of the mechanisms for resolving the Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict. The legal system of resolution is a process whereby litigants in a chieftaincy dispute resort to the law courts for determination of the outcome. A representative of the Regional House of Chief said that:

‘after the first classes between the Balonosi and Muliabee gates in May 2005, the Upper West Regional House of Chiefs advised that, those who are not satisfied with the decision of the Waala Traditional Council (the ruling that declares Mr. James Dumah as the legitimate occupant of the Funsì skin) to appeal. It surprises me that while the legal processes are ongoing and they engaging in violent confrontations with one another again’’

(Interview with a representative of the Wa Regional House of Chiefs, 10th May, 2019).



Notwithstanding the delay in the justice system, and the resources demand in pursuit of justice in court, the feuding parties still resorted to the legal system to settle the Funsu Chieftaincy dispute. From the filing fee in court, paying for the services of a lawyer, meeting bail conditions, to paying the penalties awarded in the court, all these demand resources. Also, the winner and loser scenario outcome of court justice system can cause frustration, pains and hatred in the hearts of the losers. This has the tendency for the Funsu Chieftaincy conflict to degenerate into renewed clashes. Thus, the winner of the court case may be in jubilation that could infuriate the loser and trigger renewed clashes. However, in democracy, the court is the final institution that can pass judgment on a case and brings it to a closure.

This concurred with Owusu-Mensah (2013:42) finding that the legal system to resolve chieftaincy dispute is grounded in “the constitution; enactments made by or under the authority of the Parliament established by the constitution; existing laws; orders, rules and regulations made by any other authority under a power conferred by the constitution and the common law of Ghana”.

Dialogue and capacity building was one of the mechanisms identified for resolving the Funsu Chieftaincy Conflict. Regional Peace Council Representative said that:

‘Dialogue as a conflict resolution mechanism would allow the parties to the Funsu Chieftaincy Conflict various avenues for resolving the conflict without recourse to violence. So, neutral civil society organizations and personalities are used to facilitate the dialogue for a win-win scenario on the negotiation table to the conflicting parties’.

(Interview with representative of Wa Regional Peace Council, 13th May, 2019).



The use of neutral parties to organize and moderate the dialogue get to allay the fears of the conflicting parties where each feuding gate pours out their emotions, frustration, threats, interest, position about the conflict. The sharing of each party's concern in dialogue water down the suspicion and builds the capacity of the conflicting parties to understand the need to resolve the differences and not through violence. So, the contending gates tend to understand one another better and together chart a good path for themselves. Once the people understand themselves better, they appreciate one another and work together. The use of dialogue should be encouraged as it builds trust among the parties. The parties share their various shades of opinions and perspectives which are laid bare and thereby building the capacity of the parties involved.

NGOs on conflict management should build the capacities of the litigating gates and encourage them to dialogue for a better solution as a better way of handling the Funsí Chieftaincy Conflict.

Use of eminent personalities was seen as one of the ways of resolving the Funsí chieftaincy conflict.

A sub-Chief found that:

'the eminent personalities are power brokers who use their influence and respect earned in society to inspire the feuding gates and help each side of the gates to freely speak their minds for them to come out with a lasting solution'.

(Interview with a sub-chief in Funsí traditional area).

These personalities talk to the parties, they listen to the parties, they are truthful to their words, intervene and resolve the issue by using the right channels our forefathers

used in installing a chief. They exhibit wisdom, experience and long track record with knowledge about the chieftaincy system and thereby the right person to interpret intriguing issues of the conflict. The eminent personalities could use their positions to maintain peace. They calm down tensions by engaging the parties involved. The eminent personalities are able to use their resources and knowledge to calm down nerves during confrontations and bring about peaceful co-existence. So this involve multi-stakeholders role where civil society, government, the Wa East District Assembly, political parties, experts in the conflict and other opinion leaders in and outside the Funsì Traditional area require to exercise restraint in their commentary. These various persons play a critical role to assist the eminent personalities sensitize the respective gates, residents and general public in and outside the entire Funsì Traditional area on the need to allow peace to prevail.



CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

The chapter gave a brief highlight of the findings on the factors impeding the lawful installation of the chief of Funsì, socio-cultural, economic and political effects of the Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict and mechanisms for resolving the conflict.

5.1 Summary of Major Findings

An underlying assumption in the study was that the recurrent violence has negatively affected the socio-economic and political development of Funsì and the entire Traditional Area. This assumption has been tested by examining the impeding factors of the conflict and the impact of the violent conflict on Socio-cultural, Economic and Political. In this concluding chapter the research findings are summarized and recommendations towards the resolution of the conflict are made.

5.1.1 Factors Impeding the Lawful Installation of the Funsì Chief

The study revealed that inadequate documentation on succession route was one of the impeding factors fuelling the Funsì Chieftaincy conflict. This allowed royals and non-royal gates and individuals that were qualified and those not qualified respectively to infiltrate and jungle for the skin which fomented the troubles in the Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict. It was so because in the past, the people of Funsì did not anticipate any misunderstanding and struggle in the succession route to the Funsì Chieftaincy title, and as such, they had no written document on the rightful persons, qualification, selection and installation as a chief in Funsì. Once the records were not watertight but based on oral tradition as to the one who succeeds the chief, the feuding gates would



continue to compete to undo one another and the gate that over powers the others would impose itself on the Traditional area as the overlord.

Also, not complying with tradition was another factor that continued to fuel the conflict. The customs and traditions were sidestepped and not adhered to as people did not want to follow laid down traditions of becoming a chief in the Funsɩ Traditional area. This disregard for tradition on the enskinment of chiefs in the Traditional area had been violated with impunity to the extent that the “Beetina” (the earth priest/ owner of the community) failed to consult all the kingmakers to nominate a candidate and present to him after the Reagent hands over the administration of the village to him (the Beetina) as the culture and tradition of Funsɩ demands. The “Beetina” contravened the chieftaincy tradition in Funsɩ by unilaterally accepting the nomination and installation of Mr. D. K. Togdia from Balonosi gate when all kingmakers were not present. Still on not complying with tradition, the then Presiding member, Hon. Jagiari Nbeeyengi and the Coordinating Director of Wa Municipal Assembly equally contravenes the customs and tradition of Funsɩ for causing the arrest and detention of Mr. D. K. Togdia by the Wa Municipal Council and the subsequent transfer of the matter to the “Wa Naa’ for arbitration. It was evidently clear that the feuding gates were not following the customs and tradition with respect to the qualification, selection and installation of the chief of Funsɩ. Sadly though, the respective feuding gates were adulterating the customs and some practices of the Funsɩ and subjected the tradition to falsification, conjecturing and subjective interpretation opened to a lot of biases.



Mistrust was another impediment of the Funsì chieftaincy conflict where the contending gates tend to be suspicious of one another. Vengeance became the antidote and weapon used against one another to the extent that some of the gates felt that their gates would be eliminated from the succession line should certain gates be allowed to succeed the throne. The natives, regents and even the kingmakers had no trust for anyone of the gates because they knew not what may be the reaction of any of the gates in the near future, in case one gate got the nod to be on the throne.

Poverty was another factor impeding the installation of a chief in Funsì. The inability of people to acquire their basic needs allowed them to be used and manipulated by self-serving people contending for the Funsì Chieftaincy title. So the poor and unemployed clamored and support the contending personalities and gates who wield reasonable influence to fight for the Funsì Chieftaincy title such that, they the supporters would in turn profit from. The perception was that becoming a chief attracts wealth and status that the position could help to overcome their poverty.

Politics was noticed as another factor derailing the peace efforts in the Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict. Some political actors used the opportunity to meddle in the chieftaincy conflict by supporting gates that were faithful and loyal to their political course contest for the title. These politicians had their parochial interest and as a result, provided funding and their power to influence the masses as well as made prejudicial statements against the other contending gate(s). These politicians influence the decision of the court either by hiring lawyers to defend their preferred gate's members to advance their course which generated crisis in the Funsì chieftaincy conflict. Even for fear of losing votes, political figures were afraid to do the right



things that would have brought permanent resolution of the chieftaincy conflict in Funsì.

Furthermore, ascribed nature of the chieftaincy institution is one of the impediments to the resolution of the Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict. The royal gates enjoyed the monopoly to ascend to the skin and accrue any returns from the skin for themselves since they were the only gates entitled to occupy the chieftaincy status and therefore, the chief ought to always come from their side. So people who were perceived to be at the losing side rose up and to jungle for the title as well. Other gates tried to bypass and usurped the turn of the opposing gates to occupy the Funsì Chieftaincy title which caused the protracted conflict. The authority and prestige attached to the chieftaincy was a force to reckon with and therefore, people from eligible gates and ineligible gates rose to contest for the chieftaincy title.

5.1. 2 Socio-Cultural Effects of the Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict

Injuries and deaths were recorded from the study as socio-cultural effects of the Funsì chieftaincy conflict. The case where guns, machetes and other weapons were used in times of renewed clashes in the Funsì Chieftaincy conflict led to deaths that the victims have to deal with. So, the Funsì inhabitants lost their friends, spouses, parents and other relatives through the conflicts who would have been bread winners and left behind dependents to struggle to survive.

Also, trauma was a socio-cultural effect of the Funsì Chieftaincy conflict. The renewed clashes and violence of the conflict caused deep and long-standing pain and hatred in the hearts of people. The stress and frustration people had from the violence of the Funsì Chieftaincy conflict had physical, social, emotional, mental and



economic stress on the victims, relatives of the victims and the inhabitants of the Traditional area particularly where women and children lived in fear and panic in any renewed clashes.

Another socio-cultural effect of the Funsì Chieftaincy conflict was that, the conflict left people homeless during renewed clashes. Houses were touched and the victims forced to stay with other relatives and friends or sleep outside because they had no alternatives. Also, in such violent periods of the conflict, schools and shops were disrupted as they were compelled to close down which forced people including public sector workers to leave Funsì to other towns for fear of reprisal attacks. Some public sector workers were resisting posting to the Traditional Area as those there were bracing for transfers outside the Traditional area and even the district.

One other effect of the conflict was the damage to infrastructure in the Traditional Area. The Wa East District Assembly spent monies in managing the conflict and this was a drain on local and national resources at the expense of development such as building of schools, health centre's, roads, offices, public housing, boreholes, training of manpower, refurbishing of other public institutions, among others. This caused slow pace of development since the conflict placed a lot of stress on the limited infrastructure and resources. Even during the times of escalation in the Funsì Chieftaincy conflict, people went about destroying public places like schools, health facilities and other government buildings. These acts of vandalism increased maintenance cost of the facilities.

Moreover, collapsed of social ties was another socio-cultural effect of the Funsì conflict. The spirit of unity was waning in the town as the conflict had broken the



cordial relationship among people in the town. The spirit of togetherness was eroding and the contending gates of Funsì no more saw themselves as one. The respective gates perceived themselves never safe to freely reach out to the other sections of the opposite gates and the inter- gate humanity, goodwill and support for one another was being impaired. The factions breed mistrust against themselves and through this frowning on marriage opportunities, relations and patronage of social gathering was endangered.

Lastly, difficulty to access health, education and other social services was another socio-cultural effect of the Chieftaincy Conflict in the Funsì. During the renewed clashes of the conflict, the respective gates feared to attend school, seek healthcare, fetch water, buy food, and transact businesses and other social services from the opponents' sections within the Funsì. The right to health, education and other social services were undermined among inhabitants of Funsì if the conflict is not managed and resolved properly. As such, this had the potential to affect the standards of the quality of health, education and the pace of development which are important determinants of the availability of human capital and labour quality for employment creation and productivity.

5.1.3 Economic and Political Effects of the Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict

One prominent economic effect was dwindling food production. The conflict made each of the factions unwilling to release land, farm inputs and implement to the opponents. During renewed clashes, the conflict made farmers of the town unable to access their farms particularly those around their opponent's side. Each of the gates became careful not to get to their farms too early or return from the farm too late for



fear of reprisal attacks from the opponents and this did affect the working time of farmers on their farms and agricultural production.

Price hike became another economic effect of the Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict in the Funsì Traditional area. Any time the conflict degenerated into clashes people from the contesting gates increased prices to take undue advantage of the conflict and exploit others. This was because the conflict left a volatile business environment which was not safe to deal with but rather a risk to choose to sell in such a volatile environment that no one knew who would be attacked next. Therefore, the conflict scared business men and women away from investing in the community. So, the few brave traders who risk their lives to the market would be forced to sell inferior goods that have increased in prices to make up the risk.

Also, low sales were an economic effect of the Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict in the town. In times of violent confrontations people who were sellers and customers did not patronize the Funsì market for fear of attacks. As a result, people who could have been sellers and customers refused to attend the market since dealing with people from one of the opposite gate might be misconstrued as been loyal to the gate by the other contending gate. These acts make the place unattractive for investors and caused relocation of businesses.

Furthermore, difficulty in accessing transport to travel was

Another Economic effect identified. In times of renewed clashes, the fear of violent eruption makes commercial drivers and transport owners not in a position to move to Funsì.



The vehicle owners feared that their vehicles when allowed to commute through the conflict prone road would be attacked and damaged. As a result, they feel it was not safe bringing their cars to the area in times of renewed clashes and therefore, passengers find it difficult to access transport.

Moreover, soaring unemployment was identified as one other economic effect in the Funsì Chieftaincy conflict. The violence eruption puts fear in the business owners and scared investors to establish maintain or expand businesses in such a volatile conflict environment. As the investors became unwilling to invest in the area to create job opportunities for the youth, this pushed the inhabitants working or who would have worked in those businesses into joblessness in the Funsì.

Loss of labour force was another economic effect of the Chieftaincy conflict that the study found in the town. When the Funsì Chieftaincy conflict degenerated into violence clashes, some people involved in the conflict sustained wounds, displaced and others forced to run away from the area. Through these, the working population was lost to deaths, disability and migration from Funsì to other areas. Also, other victims within the working class got to miss work in the Funsì Traditional area. So the Traditional area tends to lose critical human resource at the work places within the Funsì.

Lastly, upsurge in middlemen in business was another economic effect of the conflict. The feuding gates treated one another as bitter rivals and almost impossible to engage in inter-gate trade. So, middlemen use this as a conduit and opportunity to infiltrate the gates not only for business purposes but to foment trouble, fuel and escalate the tension in the conflict. Also, the respective gates members could not go to certain



people and places in the town to do their businesses and work freely unimpeded for which the services of middlemen or hidden sale agents became inevitable.

5.1.4 Mechanisms for Resolving the Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict

The study found that supernatural arbitration through oracle, sworn and herbs drinking were mechanisms to resolve the chieftaincy conflict in Funsì. When the contesting gates abide by this mechanism, the non-royals, unqualified gates, litigants and disputants within the royal gates would be scared off from routing for the title. This was because the fear of the consequence and the punishment from the gods would deter the unqualified persons who wanted to impose themselves on the throne.

Also, the study found sensitization and public campaign as a mechanism to resolve the Chieftaincy Conflict. This would create the awareness of the people on the negative implication of the Chieftaincy conflict such that the conflicting parties would appreciate the need to promote peace and give peace a chance in Funsì. This would expose the parties involved in the conflict and other residents to understand the effects of the conflict to the area and those who were ignorant would get to understand the asset of peace.

Furthermore, the use of security forces was noticed as a fundamental mechanism in the study for resolving the Chieftaincy Conflict in Funsì. The security forces monitored to pick signal on any rising tension of the conflict and came in to protect and save lives and properties, and thereby, maintain law and order. The continuous presence and use of security forces in the conflict area was the right way to go to reduce simmering tension in the area. Notwithstanding the critical role of the security forces, this was a violent mechanism, and the nonviolence conflict resolution mechanisms are explored and used as the option. This would forestall the public



criticism of the security forces for their brutal use of force in brokering peace in conflict.

Moreover, the study found that the use of legal system was another mechanism for resolving the dispute or conflict. This is where litigants battle it out at the law courts in a non-violent manner. The court provides the litigants the opportunity to present the cases and based on the evidences provided to the court, a determination would be made. The winner and loser scenario outcome of court justice system was noticed to create frustration, pains and hatred in the hearts of the losers. This had the tendency to relapse the conflict into renewed clashes as the winner of the court case may be in jubilation that could infuriate the loser and trigger renewed clashes.

Dialogue and capacity building was one of the mechanisms identified for resolving the Conflict. This required the use of neutral parties to organize and moderate discussions between and among the conflicting parties where each feuding gate pours out their emotions, frustration, threats, interest and positions about the conflict. The sharing of each party's concern in discussions water down the suspicion and builds the capacity of the conflicting parties to understand the need to resolve their differences peacefully and not through violence. The parties then would tend to understand one another better and together chart a common path of peace for themselves. Once the people understand themselves better, they appreciate one another and work together.

Lastly, use of eminent personalities was seen as one of the options that could be used to resolve the Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict. The work of these personalities was found to be multi-stakeholder roles where civil societies, government representatives, the



Wa East District Assembly, political parties, experts in conflict management and other opinion leaders in and outside the Funsì Traditional area who are neutral could be brought together as one team to impress upon the contesting gates to cease fire. These personalities are usually self-accomplished individuals who earned respect from the society thereby wield influence and have the capacity to use their wisdom, experience and long track record to serve as power brokers among contesting gates to make and maintain peace in the struggle succession for the skin among the feuding gates. They calm down tensions to allow peace to prevail for peaceful co-existence.

5.2 Conclusion

The Funsì chieftaincy conflict continue to witness the renewed of clashes from the inadequate documentation on succession route, the feuding gates not complying with tradition, ascribed nature of the chieftaincy institution, mistrust among the conflicting parties, poverty among the parties, and politicization of the Conflict. The use of non-violent mechanisms such as supernatural arbitration through oracles, and herbs drinking, sensitization and public campaign, use of legal system, dialogue and capacity building, and the use of eminent personalities to prevail upon the feuding gates to cease fire could help reduce the tension in the community.

Public education by NGOs Civil Society Organizations could also help to minimize the violent confrontations in the community since many of the youth who are usually instigated to undertake those actions do not know the consequences of such actions.

5.3 Limitations of the Study

A number of limitations were encountered in undertaking this study. The most outstanding was inadequate data that could have further enriched the study and enhanced the



analysis greatly due to the sensitive nature of this study. Gaining access to the institutions indicated and especially key staff who could speak to the issues concerned was a major challenge because of the busy schedule of these officials, even though the researcher moved round and booked time that was convenient for each respondent and was following that scheduled time.

A more profound challenge was gaining access to the sub-chiefs within the Traditional Area due to the complex and dynamic nature of the Dispute. Not only were they reluctant in commenting on the dispute, it was also time consuming and expensive as one had to go through a number of traditional practices before seeing a chief. As said in the Akan language „yen ko ohene anim ne nsa pan“ (literally translated to mean we don't go to the king's palace with empty hands), seeing the chief required some cola or token of money. These are not to induce or influence the chief or interviewees; it is just the tradition and custom. Regardless of these difficulties, some Chiefs granted the research interviews without the researcher going through these requirements.

Consequently, resources such as time and money became a major challenge. Raising money to undertake the field research was very hectic and tedious. The researcher however managed with his meager salary.

In addition, the interviewees would not go beyond a certain time because of their busy schedules. As a result, some questions that needed further probing to enhance the analysis were left for future dates that never materialized. The limited time spent with these interviewees was however very fruitful.



Another interesting challenge encountered was the signing of the consent form. Many respondents wondered why they should sign any form because it was not the norm in the area.

Lastly, a major challenge was the ability to assess the DCE for his view. He did not want to be seen meddling in Chieftaincy issues. However, the researcher managed to have an interaction with him.

5.4 Recommendations

The research makes a number of recommendations for government and policy makers;

1. The Regional House of Chiefs of the Upper West Region should constitute eminent personalities who are not only neutral but accepted by the conflicting gates, to lead and facilitate a dialogue and campaign process which would be for the parties to share their various shades of opinions, perspectives, frustrations and fears on the negotiation table to demystify the mistrust for a win-win scenario in the Funsí chieftaincy Conflict resolution.
2. The Upper West Regional House of Chiefs should remember the popular axiom
3. that justice delayed is justice denied'and speeds up the adjudicating processes at the Judicial Committee (JC). This is because parties to a conflict, when they sense that the case is been unduly delayed, usually take the law into their hands. This has been the case with the Funsí conflict. A petition filed against Mr. James Dumah's installation in 2006 has since been pending. A swift determination of cases brought before JC will instill some confidence in the committee. In furtherance to this, the government should adequately and timely resource this Judicial Committee to enable it to discharge its duties timely and efficiently.





4. The government and elders of the Finsi should explore the use of non-formal
5. Mechanisms such as mediation (use of statesmen and prominent personalities) to settle the Conflict. This is because the formal mechanisms, particular the court/legal system, usually Produce a winner-loser or winner-takes-all outcome. In such a situation, the loser(s) is prone to not accept defeat and persist with the conflict. However, a mediation effort, which aims at a winner-winner outcome, is more likely to resolve the conflict situation.
6. With political colorization of most of the chieftaincy disputes in Ghana, the only way out for the government is to facilitate dialogue and mediation among the factions.
7. All factions to the conflict must make some concessions. Taking entrenched
8. Positions as it is now will make it difficult for the resolution of the conflict. Each of the factions believed strongly it is their turn to provide the Finsi Chief. While each faction may have a legitimate claim; it is only when concessions are made that a solution will be found. Though difficult, one of the factions must be willing to let go the throne for a new rotation to kick in because the rotation that was started years back obviously has not worked as expected. However, any such concessions ought to be sealed by a court of competence, well documented and stored for future reference should the need be.
9. There should be a conscious effort by the government, National and Regional
10. Houses of Chiefs and the Finsi Kingmakers to codify the succession line to the Finsi Skin as mandated by Article 272(b) of the 1992 Constitution. This will remove any ambiguity Should the skin become vacant.

5.5 Future Research

The study has opened up many opportunities for future research. Future research may look at the inter-relationship between gender and chieftaincy to assess the gender dimensions of the chieftaincy institution.

In addition, there is very limited literature and research on the activities of the National and Regional Houses of Chiefs and especially the Judicial Committees of these Houses. This research further leads to the question of land and chieftaincy, ethnicity and chieftaincy and democratic representation and chieftaincy. These questions were beyond the scope of this research. Further research into these areas will enhance the understanding of traditional institutions in Ghana and Africa as a whole.



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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1

SEMI-STRUCTURE INTERVIEW GUIDE

My name is Baaberihin Suler, Master of Philosophy student in Development Studies of the Department of Africa and General Studies of the University for Development Studies. I am interested in understanding the factors that impede the lawful installation of the paramount chief of Finsi Traditional Area, Social-cultural effects of the chieftaincy conflict of the Finsi Traditional Area, economic and political implications of the conflict and lastly, mechanisms to resolve the chieftaincy conflict in the Finsi Traditional area. If you permit me, I will be recording the session because I do not want to miss any of your comments. Although I will be taking some notes during the session, I cannot possibly write fast enough to get it all down. All responses will be kept confidential. This means that your interview responses will only be shared with research team members like my supervisor and external supervisor and we will ensure that any information we include in our report does not identify you as the respondent. Remember, you are not obliged to take part and you can end the interview at any time.

Thank you for accepting to participate in this research.



Demographic Characteristics

1. Sex of respondent: Male [1] Female [2]
2. Educational level of respondent: Basic [1] Senior High school (SHS) [2]
Tertiary [3]
3. Ethnicity of respondent
4. Gate belong/associated with: Kunkongbuni gate [1] Gbeelonosi gate [2]
Muliabee gate [3] Kpanjagabee- the kingmakers [4] none [5]
5. Which gate do you think the new paramount chief of the Funsì
Traditional area should come from? Kunkongbuni gate [1] Gbeelonosi gate
[2] Muliabee Gate [3] Kpanjagabee- a kingmaker [4] None [5] others [6]
(specify).....
6. Why?
.....

Causes Impeding the Lawful Installation Of The Funsì Chief

7. What in your opinion is/are the cause(s) of the conflict of Funsì?
.....

8. Explain in table 1, how each of these is or are cause(s), and rate from 1
as the major cause to 7 as the least cause of the Funsì Chieftaincy conflict.



Table 1: Causes Impeding the Installation of the Funsì Chieftaincy

No	Causes of the Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict	Explain why each is a factor (If applicable)	Rating
9.	Ascribe nature of chieftaincy	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	
10.	Inadequate document on the succession route	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	
11.	Politics	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	
12.	Not complying with tradition	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	



13.	Self aggrandizement	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	
14.	Poverty	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	
15.	Mistrust	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	



16. If there are others specify.....

Socio-Cultural Effects of the Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict

17. What in your opinion are the social-cultural effects of the conflict of Funsì?

.....

.....

Explain in table 2 how each of these is a social-cultural effect of the Funsì Chieftaincy conflict.

Table 2: Socio-Cultural Effects of the Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict

No	Socio-cultural effects of the Funsì chieftaincy conflict	Explain why each is a factor (If applicable)	Rating
18.	Kills and injured people	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	
19.	Trauma	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	
20.	Renders people homeless	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	
21.	Forced migration	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	



22.	Damage infrasture	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	
23.	Collapsed of social ties	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	
24.	Prevents access to health, education and other social services	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	



25. If there are others

specify.....

.....

Economic and Political Effects of the Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict

26. What in your opinion are the economic and political effects of the conflict of Funsì?

.....

.....

Explain in table 3 how each of these is/are economic and political effect(s) of the Funsì Chieftaincy conflict.

Table 3: Economic and Political Effects of the Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict

No	Economic and political effects of the Funsì chieftaincy conflict	Explain why each is a factor (If applicable)	Rating
27.	Dwindling food production	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	
28.	Price hike	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	





		
29.	Low sales	
30.	Difficulty in accessing transport to travel	
31.	Soaring unemployment	
32.	Loss of labour force	

33.	Upsurge in middle men in business	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	
-----	--------------------------------------	--	--

34. If there are others specify.....

**MECHANISMS TO RESOLVE THE CHIEFTAINCY CONFLICT
IN THE FUNSI TRADITIONAL AREA.**

35. What in your opinion are the mechanisms to resolve the conflict of
Fungsi?

.....

Explain in table 4 how each of these is a mechanism to resolve the Fungsi
Chieftaincy conflict.



Table 4: Mechanisms to Resolve the Chieftaincy Conflict in the Funs

Traditional Area.

No	Conflict resolution mechanism	Explain why each is a factor (If applicable)
36.	Supernatural arbitration through oracle, sworn and herbs drinking	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>
37.	Sensitization and public campaigns	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>
38.	Use of security forces	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>
39.	Use of legal system	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>



	
40.	Dialogue and capacity building
41.	Use of eminent personalities

42. If there are others specify.....



My name is Baaberihin Suler, Master of Philosophy student in Development Studies of the Department of Africa and General Studies of the University for Development Studies. I am interested in understanding the factors that impede the lawful installation of the paramount chief of Funsì Traditional Area, Social-cultural effects of the chieftaincy conflict of the Funsì Traditional Area, economic and political implications of the conflict and lastly, mechanisms to resolve the chieftaincy conflict in the Funsì Traditional area. If you permit me, I will be recording the session because I do not want to miss any of your comments. Although I will be taking some notes during the session, I cannot possibly write fast enough to get it all down. All responses will be kept confidential. This means that your interview responses will only be shared with research team members like my supervisor and external supervisor and we will ensure that any information we include in our report does not identify you as the respondent. Remember, you are not obliged to take part and you can end the interview at any time.

Thank you for accepting to participate in this research.



KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR EY INFORMANTS

This interview aims to identify the main barriers or challenges that are causing and preventing the peaceful resolution of the Funsí Chieftaincy Conflict.

It will focus on thematic areas that are critical to resolve the situation.

SECTION A: IDENTIFICATION

1. Date of Interview:
2. Name of institution/ Community:
3. Position:

Demographic Characteristics

1. Sex of respondent: Male [1] Female [2]
2. Educational level of respondent: Basic [1] Senior High school (SHS) [2]
Tertiary [3]
3. Ethnicity of respondent
4. What is your position in this organization?

.....
.....

Causes Impeding the Lawful Installation Of The Funsí Chief

7. What in your opinion is/are the cause(s) of the conflict of Funsí?
.....
8. Explain in table 1, how each of these is or are cause(s), and rate from 1 as the major cause to 7 as the least cause of the Funsí Chieftaincy conflict.



Table 1: Causes Impeding the Installation of the Funsì Chieftaincy

No	Causes of the Funsì chieftaincy conflict	Explain why each is a factor (If applicable)	Rating
9.	Ascribe nature of chieftaincy	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	
10.	Inadequate documentation on the succession route	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	
11.	Politics		
12.	Not complying with tradition	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	
13.	Self aggrandizement	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	





		
14.	Poverty	
15.	Mistrust	
12.	Not complying with tradition	
13.	Self aggrandizement	
14.	Poverty	

		<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	
15.	Mistrust	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	

16. If there are others specify.....

Socio-Cultural Effects of the Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict

17. What in your opinion are the social-cultural effects of the conflict of Funsì?

.....

.....

Explain in table 2 how each of these is a social-cultural effect of the Funsì Chieftaincy conflict.



Table 2: Socio-Cultural Effects of the Funsí Chieftaincy Conflict

No	Socio-cultural effects of the Funsí chieftaincy conflict	Explain why each is a factor (If applicable)	Rating
18.	Kills and injured people	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	
19.	Trauma	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	
20.	Renders people homeless	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	
21.	Forced migration	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	



22.	Damage infrasture	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	
23.	Collapsed of social ties	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	
24.	Prevents access to health, education and other social services	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	



25. If there are others specify.....

.....

.....

Economic and Political Effects of the Funsì Chieftaincy Conflict

26. What in your opinion are the economic and political effects of the conflict of Funsì?

.....

.....

Explain in table 3 how each of these is/are economic and political effect(s) of the Funsì Chieftaincy conflict.

Table 3: Economic and Political Effects of the Funsì Chieftaincy

Conflict

No	Economic and political effects of the Funsì chieftaincy conflict	Explain why each is a factor (If applicable)	Rating
27.	Dwindling food production	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	
28.	Price hike	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	
29.	Low sales	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	





30.	Difficulty in accessing transport to travel	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	
31.	Soaring unemployment	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	
32.	Loss of labour force	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	
33.	Upsurge in middle men in business	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>	

34. If there are others specify.....

**MECHANISMS TO RESOLVE THE CHIEFTAINCY CONFLICT
IN THE FUNSI TRADITIONAL AREA.**

35. What in your opinion are the mechanisms to resolve the conflict of
Fungsi?.....

Explain in table 4 how each of these is a mechanism to resolve the Fungsi
Chieftaincy conflict.



Table 4: Mechanisms to Resolve the Chieftaincy Conflict in the Funsii Traditional Area.

No	Conflict resolution mechanism	Explain why each is a factor (If applicable)
36.	Supernatural arbitration through oracle, sworn and herbs drinking	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>
37.	Sensitization and public campaigns	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>
38.	Use of security forces	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>
39.	Use of legal system	<p>.....</p> <p>.....</p>



	
40.	Dialogue and capacity bilding
41.	Use of eminent personalities

42. If there are others specify.....



43. We have come to the end of our interview. Do you have any additional suggestions?

.....
.....

Thank you.



MINUTES OF THE ARBITRATION ON THE FUNSI CHIEFTAINCY DISPUTE HELD AT WA-NAA'S PALACE BY WA-NAA AND THE THREE CONTESTANTS MESSRS KUSEU D.K TOGDIA, JAMES BADUON DUMAH AND ALHAJ NUHU AWURO BADUON AND THE BETINA HABBIE LANKORI

Wa-Naa and His Counsellors

Wa-Naa Yakubu Seidu Soale II
 Selee-Naa Fuseini Seidu
 Satigu-Naa Saaka Yakubu
 Adama Braimah
 Bugbelee-Naa Yahaya Alhaj Adama
 Alhaji Awudu (Elder) Yeri-Naa representative
 Sosoro (Elder) Tendaana representative
 Guli-Naa Seidu Braimah

Contestants

Kuseu D.K. Togdia from Balonosi Royal Gate
 Alhaji Nuhu Awuro from Balonosi Royal Gate
 James Baduon Duma from Muliabelle Royal Gate

Supporters In Attendance

Abdul Mumuni (Prince)	- Muliabelle Gate
Suari Jegieri (Prince)	- Muliabelle Gate
Ali Kapihole (Prince)	- Kunkonballe Gate
Issa Bayong (Prince)	- Balonosi Gate
Nyabe Mahama (Prince)	- Balonosi Gate
Bawa Hillie (Prince)	- Balonosi Gate
Samuel Bakuri (Prince)	- Balonosi Gate
Iddrisu Nnwanye (Prince)	- Balonosi Gate
Nuhu Alh-Baduon (Prince)	- Balonosi Gate
Dumah Hillie (Prince)	- Balonosi Gate
Mahamudu Kpinde (Prince)	- Balonosi Gate
Nalayaakina Duma (Prince)	- Kunkonballe Gate
Togdia Kofi (Prince)	- Kunkonballe Gate
Lankor Habibie (Tendaana)	- Kpanjagabei Gate
Balong Dan-yaa (Tendaana)	- Kpanjagabei Gate
Abu Jarimua (Prince)	- Muliabelle Gate
Seidu Baman (Prince)	- Muliabelle Gate
Baba Suari (Prince)	- Muliabelle Gate
Nkawiada Nwadei (Prince)	- Kunkonballe Gate
Batong Dalugu (Prince)	- Kunkonballe Gate
Bakuli Gingan-ni (Prince)	- Balonosi Gate
Baachaarin Baachoginyu (Prince)	- Balonosi Gate
Bakuli Bayong (Prince)	- Balonosi Gate

Consensus On Arbitration

The Wa-Naa and his council then sought consensus on the arbitration from all parties especially the three (3) contesting parties

They all assured the Wa-Naa of their readiness to arbitrate and assured the meeting of their commitment to accept the arbitration award. D. K. Togdia further indicated that the Traditional Council and the Courts do not speak the truth and that traditionally, the Wa-Naa's Palace was the right place for resolving the case.

After having received assurances from all parties to participate in the arbitration process, the meeting agreed that the arbitration process should commence on 16th March, 2006.

ARBITRATION

The arbitration commenced on the 16th march 2006 as scheduled.

After outlining the meeting procedures, the three (3) contestants were invited to start the arbitration process. The contestants were

- a) D.K. Togdia from Balonosi Royal Gate
- b) Alhaji Nuhu Awuro from Balonosi Royal Gate
- c) James Baduon Duma from Mulliabee Royal Gate

They were asked one by one to state the reasons why and how they are entitled to claim the Funsu Skin. Their responses are summarized below:

D.K. Togdia:

D.K. Togdia stated that he is the Kuseu of Funsu and according to him, by custom and tradition the sitting Kuseu becomes the next of kin to the Funsu Skins. He added that, there were two (2) Royal Gates in Funsu; Balonosi and Kunkonbuni and the skin is on rotational basis. He indicated that the skin went from the Balonosi gate to the Kunkonbuni gate and claimed as it was coming back to Balonosi, it was his turn.

Alhaji Nuhu Awuro:

Alhaji Nuhu Awuro indicated that he is a prince from the Balonosi Royal gate of Funsu and rejected the assertion that the Kuseu is the next of kin to the Funsu Skins. He mentioned a number of chiefs who became chiefs without become Kuseus. He further stated that there are two (2) royal gates to the Funsu skin namely; Balonosi and Kunkonbuni who come in turns as the skin rotates. He added that Nwadei Bayong succeeded Sampuo Hilia the senior brother of D.K. Togdia and that if it's now the turn of the Balonosi gate, it was his turn.

James Baduon Duma:

James Baduon Duma stated that there are three (3) royal gates to the Funsu Skins which were Balonosi, Kunkonbuni and Mulliabee who come in turns as the skin rotates among the three (3) gates. He also indicated that it is not true that the Kuseu is automatically the next of kin to the Funsu skins.

He indicated that it must be the turn of the Kuseu's gate for him to be able to claim the Funsu Skin. James Duma presented documentary evidence to support his claim which are stated below:

Minutes of Arbitration on Funsu Chieftaincy Dispute (2006)



COMPLAIN

- Alhaj Nuhu Aworo on the 17th of Feb, 2006 brought a complaint to the Wa-Naa on the Funsu chieftaincy dispute. He said the case was not properly routed through the traditional way. According to him, Wa-Naa is the right person by our custom to arbitrate on Funsu Chieftaincy matters. He said this was not done and the case rather went through the Wa Municipal Assembly to the Waala Traditional Council.

He added that the Waala Traditional Council ruled wrongly on the case and he appealed to the high court against their ruling and therefore brought the case before the Wa-Naa to arbitrate to set the records straight (letter attached)

MEETING OF COUNSELLORS (ON 23RD FEBRUARY 2006)

The Wa-Naa convened a meeting of his counsellors to deliberate on the the complaint and to plan appropriately for the arbitration process.

At the end of the meeting, Wa-Naa and his counsellors resolved to invite the contesting parties on 8th march 2006 to ascertain if all parties agreed the to arbitrate the issue.

PREPARING THE GROUNDS FOR THE ARBITRATION

The meeting was convened on the 8th of March 2006 purposely to seek the consent of all parties to arbitrate the dispute.

In attendance

- Wa-Naa and his counsellors
- Complainants: a) Alhaj Nuhu and supporters
b) D.K. Togdia and supporters
- Respondents: James Baduon Duma and supporters
- Funsu Tendaana (Beetina).

Proceedings

The Wa-Naa asked the Beetina to brief him and his counsellors on the case. The Beetina narrated that two (2) months after the funeral rites of the late chief was performed, the Funsu community was handed over to him after a lot of problems. As custom demands, he (the Beetina) convened a meeting of the Princes to elect a successor to the late chief. Unfortunately, they could not elect a new chief due to quarrels that ensued at the meeting. The Wa Municipal Assembly intervened to prevent any commotions and later transferred the case to the Waala Traditional Council and then to the Wa-Naa for determination.

After some deliberations, the Wa-Naa and his counsel advised the Funsu Tendaana to return and attempt to solve issue again among themselves and that if they fail the second time, then Wa-Naa and his Counsellors would then intercede

However, based on the previous experiences, the Funsu Tendaana exclaimed that they would beat him if he attempted to solve the issue further and therefore pleaded with the Wa-Naa to intercede immediately to solve the impasse in Funsu

Minutes of Arbitration on Funsu Chieftaincy Dispute (2006)

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Wa-Naa Yakubu Seidu Soale (II)

1st May, 2006

PRESIDENT
WALA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL
WA - UIWA

Mohammed Bawachera
(Registrar, Waala Traditional Council)

1st May, 2006

REGISTRAR
WALA TRADITIONAL COUNCIL
WA - UIWA

Witness to mark:

Selee-Naa Fuseini Seidu

1st May, 2006



MEETING OF THE 27TH APRIL, 2006

At this meeting, D.K. Togdia and Alhaji Nuhu could still not agree on a candidate to represent their gate. The case was therefore adjourned to 30th April, 2006

MEETING OF THE 30TH APRIL, 2006

D.K. Togdia and Alhaji Nuhu could still not come to a compromise. They were therefore given another day to try to reach an agreement and return the following day for the arbitration to continue.

THE LAST MEETING OF THE ARBITRATION – 1ST MAY 2006

The next day (i.e. 1st may, 2006), there was still no agreement between D.K. Togdia and Alhaji Nuhu

The Wa-Naa conferred with his counsellors to determine the case as follows:

- (i) That Funsu has three (3) Royal Gates
 - Balonosi
 - Kunkonballe
 - Muliabelle
- (ii) That the Funsu skin is by rotation; and rotates among the three (3) gates
- (iii) That it is not true that the Kuseu is the automatic successor to the late Funsu Kuoro
- (iv) That the Beetina (Tendaana) has not got the power to nominate a Funsu Kuoro. He temporarily takes care of the vacant skin for the period of three (3) months. After that he convenes a meeting of Funsu Royals to nominate a successor to the Vacant Skin.
- (v) That the successor is nominated by the HEAD of the gate whose turn it is.
- (vi) That it is also established that the last Funsu Kuoro Hilia Sampuo was from Balonosi Gate. The late Kuoro Sampuo was succeeded by the late Kuoro Nwade Bayong from Kunkonbuni Gate.
- (vii) That the two gates Balonosi and Kunkonbuni have had their turns.
- (viii) That from the facts adduced, it was the turn of Muliabelle Gate to nominate, elect and enskin a new Kuoro (chief) to succeed late Kuoro Nwade Bayong

Conflicts are generated when customary laws in usage and practice are distorted and truth, justice and fairness sacrificed.

In order to prevent conflict, therefore, the Wa-Naa and his counsellors were guided by these principles. Chieftaincy hinges on tradition and customary laws in usage and practice.

Guided by theses and the facts established during the arbitration process, the Wa-Naa Yakubu Seidu Soale II duly endorsed the nomination and election of Mr. James Baduon Duma as the new Funsu Kuoro to succeed the late Funsu Kuoro Nwade Bayong.

- 1) Minutes of the 1964 Funsì Traditional Council Meeting of the 20th February, 4th paragraph captioned "Election and installation of Paramount Chiefs": "succession to the paramount chief will be in conformity with customary law in usage and practice and in rotation or in turns by the principal ruling gates. The following gates form the Paramountcy of Funsì:

Balonosi

Kunkonbuni

Muliabe....."

- 2) Proceedings of the Upper Regional House of Chiefs on the case between Nwadei Bayong and Mumuni Siafu page 8 line 3 of Mumuni Siafi, the plaintiff statement: "Apart from our Kunkonbuni Gate, there are two other gates namely Muliabele Gate and Balonosi Gates." In page 11 of the same document line 6 of P.W. 1 (D.K. Togdia) states; "I am a prince of Funsì. I hail from the Balonosi section of the Royal family of Funsì. Apart from the Balonosi section, there are two other royal gates known as Kunkonbele and Muliebele". In the same document, page 45 under P.W. 2 line 15, Baduon Awuro states: "thereafter at the second meeting if mulebele and Kunkonbale present two (2) candidates the Beetina will advice them to bring only one candidate".....

- 3) Judgement of the National House of Chiefs on the case between Nwadei Bayong and Mumuni Siafu on the 15th of May 1991, second paragraph states: "there are three gates to the Funsì skins and chieftaincy is held by rotation. It was the turn of the Kunkonbale gate" and this was agreed upon. Paragraph three (3) of the same document states: "three parties were nominated but we shall deal with the nomination of the contestants in this suit since it was not the turn of the gate of the third party and therefore did not take part."

D.K. Togdia disputed the contents of the 1964 document presented by James Duma citing that it was forged because he (D.K. Togdia) had the original one. He presented his original document however, its content was the same as James Duma's document.

Witnesses: Witnesses were called and questioned on the issue of the number of royal gates. Sympathisers of D.K. Togdia and Alhaji Nuhu maintained that there were two (2) royal gates while witnesses of James Duma strongly argued that there are three (3) royal gates.

There was however a consensus that the Skin rotates.

It was noted at the meeting that, in the document from the Upper Regional House of Chiefs, both D.K. Togdia and Alhaji Nuhu stated on record that there are three (3) royal gates in Funsì. Also in the 1964 document, it was Alhaji Nuhu, father of Awuro who was the President of the Traditional Council who stated there are three (3) Royal Gates in Funsì and these come in turns.

At this point, the meeting was adjourned to the 20th of April 2006

MEETING OF 20TH APRIL, 2006

The meeting commenced with a row call to ensure all relevant parties had arrived and this was followed by outlining the formalities of the meeting.

The counsellors examined the contestants and their witnesses to clarify some issues after which D. K. Togdia and Alhaji Nuhu were advised by the council to agree to present one candidate to contest the skin since they were both from the same gate. They were advised to agree on their candidate within a week from the date of the meeting.

The meeting was therefore adjourned to the next week (i.e. 27th April, 2006)



IN THE JUDICIAL COMMITTEE OF THE UPPER WEST
REGIONAL HOUSE OF CHIEFS WA.

1. HILLIA MUMUNI
 2. BOLILI TINTATUO
 3. HILLIA BAYONG
 4. WISIBABE BOTONG
 5. SUARA WIDUMA
- ALL OF FUNSI

... PETITIONERS

VRS
JAMES BADUON DUMA
C/O CATHOLIC MISSION, BOX 212, FUNSI, U.W.R

... RESPONDENT

Statement of Claim

1. The Petitioners are the Kingmakers of Funsì. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Petitioners hail from the Gbelonosi royal gate and the 4th and 5th also hail from the Kunkonboni royal gate of Funsì.
2. The Respondent hails from a settlor group called Mulliebelle section dwelling in Funsì.
3. The Petitioners state that in the history and custom of the Funsì people, there are 2 royal gates that ascend to the Funsì skin.
4. The Petitioners state that the two royal gates in Funsì are Gbelonosi and Kunkonboni and that the skin has alternated between the two royal gates only from time immemorial.
5. The Petitioners state that within each of the royal gates are 3 sub-gates or compounds from which princes are elected.
6. The Petitioners state that upon the death of any Funsì Kuoro, the Kingmakers choose the next chief from among the candidates who come from the appropriate family and lineage of Gbelonosi and Kunkonboni gate.



WHEREFORE THE PETITIONERS claim the following reliefs:

- a. An order for the declaration of the purported nomination and election of James Baduon Duma as Funsu Kuoro (Funsu Chief) and the confirmation by Wa Naa Yakubu Seidu Soalia II as null and void as same was done without jurisdiction and contrary to custom.
- b. An order that James Baduon Duma, his assigns representatives among others be restrained by perpetual injunction from holding out himself or registering or exercising the functions of Funsu Kuoro.
- c. An order that the names of James Baduon Duma if for any reason has been entered into any register or document as Funsu Kuoro same be deleted forthwith.
- d. A declaration that Mohammed Togdia who hails from Gbelonosi gate and whose turn it is to occupy the funsi skin and who has been duly nominated and elected by the kingmakers and presented to the Beetina as the accepted choice for onward presentation to the Wa Naa for his confirmation of Mohammed Todgia as the legitimate Funsu Kuoro (Funsu Chief).
- e. Any other just order(s).

Issued at on (.....day) theday of2019

By:.....
Registrar Regional House of Chiefs

Take notice that if you do not attend, the Judicial Committee of the Upper West Regional House of Chiefs may give judgment in your absence.



7. The Petitioners state that on the nomination and election of such an appropriate candidate the same is presented to the Beetina for his information.
8. The Petitioners state that by custom and practice of the Funsì people the nominated and elected candidate is then presented by the Beetina and the kingmakers to Wa Naa to be introduced to him for his blessing.
9. The Petitioners state that the Wa Naa, however has no traditional or customary role in the nomination and election of any Funsì Kuoro.
10. The Petitioners state that the late Funsì Kuoro Nwade Bayong was from the Kunkonboni gate and thus his death has caused the skin to be vacant all these years.
11. The Petitioners state that upon the death of Kuoro Nwade Bayong, it is the turn of the Gbelenosi gate to nominate and elect a candidate to occupy the skin.
12. The petitioners state that, after the performance of the final funeral rites of Kuoro Nwade Bayong the late Dingani Kusiau Togdia who was their heir apparent as an outdoored Kusiau of Funsì was nominated and elected as the next Funsì Kuoro by the Kingmakers.
13. The Petitioners state that it was around the same time period that the Respondent herein who is from the Mulliebelle settlor group in Funsì and thus not a royal also declared his candidate to the Funsì skin.
14. The Petitioners further state that around the same period of time Alhaji Nuhu Awuro Beduon who is a royal from the Gbelenosi gate also declared his candidature to ascend to the skin.
15. The Petitioners state that there was thus an impasse as to who was to ascend to the Funsì skin.
16. The Petitioners state that this development was reported to the then Wa Naa Alhaji Seidu Soalia by the Respondent.



17. The Petitioners state that, the said Wa Naa invited the 3 candidates to the skin to his palace for a meeting.
18. The Petitioners state that the then Wa Naa at the said meeting announced that since Dingaani Kusiau Togdia and Alhaji Nuhu Awuro Beduon who are from the same Gbelenosi gate could not agree between the two of them who to ascend the Funsu skin, he had thus given his blessing to the Respondent to become the new Funsu Kuoro.
19. That the Petitioners state that pursuant to that announcement by the Wa Naa, the Respondent has been holding himself out as Funsu Kuoro and taking steps to unlawfully outdoor himself and get his name registered as a chief of Funsu.
20. The Petitioners state that the Mulliebelle section of Funsu where the Respondent is from have never been heirs to the Funsu skin since they have no ancestral connection with the Gbelenosi and Kunkonboni royal gates who have on the other hand produced heirs to the Funsu skin.
21. The Petitioners state that Dingaani Kusiau Togdia passed on whiles the impasse between the candidates was brought before this committee for resolution by a Petition which was later struck out for want of jurisdiction.
22. The Petitioners state that the kingmakers of Gbelenosi upon the demise of Dingaani Kusiau Togdia nominated and elected one Mohammed Togdia as the next Funsu Kuoro to be outdoored.
23. The Respondent's conduct is however preventing the peaceful outdoor of Mohammed Togdia from being installed as Funsu Kuoro.

WHEREFORE THE PETITIONERS claim the following reliefs:

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- e. Any other just order(s).



A handwritten signature in black ink, likely belonging to Michael Nii Amui Amui Esq.

LAWYER FOR PETITIONERS
MICHAEL NII AMUI AMUI ESQ.
LIC NO: AR 20686/19
CHAM REG. NO: PP0004597/18
TIN NO: P0014659980

THE REGISTRAR
U. W. R.H.C., WA

AND A COPY TO THE RESPONDENT HEREIN OR HIS LAWYER